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MICHAEL L. PERLIN**
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the symbol of the insanity defense' and the
symbol of capital punishment2 have been linked-symbolically
* © 1985.
** Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Any discussion of the insanity defense-casual, epigrammatic or scholarly-must
begin with the acknowledgment that the defense operates in at least three parallel force
fields: in the field of criminal law (i.e., resolution of the issues of responsibility and
blameworthiness, see generally GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 12-13 (1967); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); Perlin, Overview of Rights in the Crimi-
nal Process, in 3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1879, 1891-92 (Prac. L.
Inst. ed. 1979); Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1945) cert. de-
nied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948) ("Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it
cannot impose blame"); Note, Due Process Concerns With Delayed Psychiatric Evalua-
tions and the Insanity Defense: Time is of the Essence, 64 B.U.L. REv. 861, 865-66
(1985)), in the field of criminal procedure (i.e., resolution of the issues of quantum of and
allocation of burden of proof, see generally id. at 866-69, and cases cited in nn. 31-37),
and in the field of symbolism. "Symbol" is defined here in its Jungian sense: "the best
possible expression for a complex fact not yet clearly apprehended by consciousness." C.
JUNG, On Psychic Energy, in 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG, THE STRUCTURE AND
DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE 75 (Hull trans. 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED
WORKS]. Jung's discussions of symbolism are particularly apt for insanity defense analy-
ses; see, e.g., Synchronicity: an Acausal Connecting Principle, COLLECTED WORKS at 417,
485-95 (historical, multicultural examples of symbolism); 5 COLLECTED WORKS: SYMBOLS
OF TRANSFORMATION, PART 2 at 231 (psychological truth of symbols); The Symbolic Life,
in 18 COLLECTED WORKS: THE SYMBOLIC LIFE 273-74 (man's need for a "symbolic life").
On the specific importance of symbolism in insanity defense jurisprudence, see, e.g.,
Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 KTY. L.J. 263 (1982-83) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Responsibility Dilemma].
2. There can be no question as to the symbolic significance of capital punishment as
a political, sociological or penological issue, either historically or contemporaneously.
See, e.g., infra notes 26-31, 336, 339.
3. The redundancy is purposeful. For a lengthy empirical study, concluding that sup-
port of the death penalty is a symbolic attitude reflecting a "symbolic perspective" of
citizens' basic values, see Tyler & Webb, Support for the Death Penalty; Instrumental
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and empirically"-in a dance of death.5 It was taken as common
wisdom that the insanity defense developed as a procedural
Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude? 17 LAW & Soc'v REV. 21, 26, 40, 43 (1982). A
recent study has concluded that "jurors who are permitted to try capital cases are more
likely to convict insane defendants than jurors representing the whole spectrum of capi-
tal punishment attitudes would be." Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The Death
Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81, 92 (1984). Survey-
ing the literature, Ellsworth and her colleagues found that a "crime control ideology has
underlain objections to the insanity defense at least since M'Naghten's case," id. at 83,
and that "pro-death jurors have been much more likely than anti-death jurors to regard
the insanity defense as a ruse and as an impediment to the conviction of criminals." Id.
at 90.
Judge Bazelon has eloquently characterized the insanity defense as "a convenient
symbolic target in [the] war of words [over the crisis in crime]." Responsibility Di-
lemma, supra note 1, at 277.
4. See, e.g., Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Insanity].
One of the earliest pleas in the legal literature for abolition of the death penalty in
this country focused on the improper execution of the insane:
Another fatal objection to capital punishment is this: . . . There have been
* . . several instances in which the alleged criminal, whose life has been taken in
this manner, has afterwards been proven insane, and therefore not responsible
for his acts. The latest case of the latter kind to which my attention has been
called is that of John Henry Barker, a half-breed negro, who, on Tuesday, July
6, at Sing Sing Prison, N.Y., was executed by electricity for the alleged crime of
murdering his wife at White Plains, on August 30, 1895. I learned from the New
York World of Wednesday, the seventh of the same month, that immediately
after the execution of this man, an autopsy by the attending physicians, Drs.
Goodwin and Sheehan, revealed the fact that the victim of this judicial murder
was the possessor of a diseased brain; and although not a violent lunatic, he was
nevertheless not in his right mind, and therefore not responsible for his conduct.
Thus it appears that the great State of New York has deliberately taken the life
of a poor negro, who, in the opinion of competent physicians, ought to have been
made a subject of medical care and treatment, rather than an object of the ven-
geance of the law. The conclusion necessarily following from these disgraceful
facts is that, in the punishment of crime, no political community has the right to
take from the convict that which it cannot restore to him after his innocence of
the crime of which he shall have been convicted may have been clearly estab-
lished, or after he may have been shown to have been an irresponsible person. So
that whatever may be said either in favor or in defense of capital punishment, I
consider this objection to it to be a decisive one, which ought to justify and to
require its immediate abolition wherever it is now practiced.
Stillman, Abolish the Death Penalty, 10 THE GREEN BAG (1898), reprinted in 4 LEGAL
REF. & SERV. Q. 89, 91-92 (1984). Some death penalty opponents have suggested that
"most criminals who were executed . . . were mentally abnormal." C. HIBBERT, THE
ROOTS OF EVIL: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 379 (1968) (referring to
members of the Howard League for Federal Reform, and to Calvert, author of CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1936)). See also White, The Psychiatric Ex-
amination and the Fifth Amendment Privilege in Capital Cases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 943, 989 (1983):
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shield primarily, if not solely, to thwart the use of the death
penalty.' While this was not the sole rationale for pleading the
defense, 7 the connection appeared inextricable: if capital punish-
ment were to be abolished, as seemed likely less than fifteen
years ago,8 the use of the defense would fade into obscurity.9
Recent developments, of course, have put this prediction to
rest. The death penalty has been revived, 10 executions have re-
newed apace," the Supreme Court appears "willing to let the
states get on with the business of executions,"'12 the trial of John
Hinckley rekindled the never-truly-moribund debate on the fu-
Since the insanity defense is seldom accepted and many capital defendants
are primarily concerned with avoiding the possibility of the death penalty, a sig-
nificant number of capital defendants may choose to present their expert psychi-
atric testimony at the penalty stage. In some respects, this result may be benefi-
cial. The empirical data suggests that in many cases the judge or jury is
interested in evaluating expert psychiatric testimony only for the purpose of de-
termining whether the defendant should be executed.
The rationales for prohibiting the execution of a "presently insane" person are listed
in Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F. 2d 526, 527 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W.
3392 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1985) (No. 85-5542).
5. Artistically, the concept of the "dance of death"-"Death ... as the Supreme
Arbiter, choosing his victims"-probably originated in Indian and/or Arabic poetry, find-
ing its way to Europe in the late twelfth century with Froidmont's essay Vers sur la
Mort; this was followed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries by a series of frescoes
by Traini (in 1395) and by an unknown artist in Paris (in 1424). The latter group,
painted at the Cemetery of the Holy Innocents and titled Danse Macabre des Hommes
et des Femmes, was translated by Guy Marchand into a popular series of woodcuts
which became the prototype for similar series of the Dance of the Skeletons which
quickly appeared throughout Europe. See, e.g., HOLBEIN's DANCE OF DEATH, AND BIBLE
WOODCUTS (1947) (reproducing Holbein's 1538 Dance of Death illustrations). See gener-
ally F. EICHENBERG, A Short Picture Essay on the Dance of Death, in DANCE OF DEATH
14, 16 (1983).
6. See infra note 27.
7. See infra note 32.
8. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The speed of the death penalty's
comeback has been frequently noted in recent months; see, e.g., Silas, The Death Pen-
alty, 71 A.B.A.J. 48 (1985). See generally Special Project: The Constitutionality of the
Death Penalty in New Jersey, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 261 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Special
Project].
9. See, e.g., L. RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 112 (1966) (the 1965 James S. Car-
pentier lectures).
10. See Special Project, supra note 8.
11. See, e.g., Streib, Executions Under the Post-Furman Capital Punishment Stat-
utes: The Halting Progression from "Let's Do It" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point in
Pulling So Tight," 15 RUTGERS L.J. 443 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Streib].
12. Zajac, Constitutional Law-Sentencing-Eighth Amendment Does Not Require
Comparative Proportionality Review in Capital Sentencing Schemes- Pulley v. Harris,
104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 145, 163 (1984).
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ture of the insanity defense,18 and-in response to the Hinckley
verdict-state legislatures and Congress rushed to restrictively
amend insanity defense laws 14 to abate the perceived public
"outrage" 1 5 at the "abuses"' 6 of the defense.
One additional dimension is added when it is further noted
that these twin vectoral forces17-resuscitation of the death pen-
alty and attempted evisceration of the insanity defense-have
been plotted out in recent years in the context of a criminal jus-
tice system where the vast majority of all criminal defendants
are indigent,' and thus dependent on some sort of public de-
fender system'9 for the provision of counsel. Each year, fewer
criminal defendants are represented by for-fee private counsel;20
conversely, more are represented by fixed-salary, full-time, pub-
licly-funded counsel.
2 1
13. See generally L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W.
HINCKLEY, JR. (1984).
14. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1985); see also State v. Korell, 690 P. 2d
992 (1984) (withstanding first constitutional challenge to Montana's abolition of the in-
sanity defense); Bender, After Abolition: The Present State of the Insanity Defense in
Montana, 45 MONT. L. REV. 133 (1984).
15. For a sampling of the literature characterizing the public as perceiving the Hinck-
ley acquittal as an "outrage," see Perlin, The Things We Do For Love: John Hinckley's
Trial and the Future of the Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts, 30 N.Y.L.ScH. L.
REV. 857 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Hinckley's Trial]; see also Simon, The Defense of
Insanity, 11 J. PSYCH & L. 183, 184 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Moran, Preface, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci.: THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 9 (1985) [hereinafter cited as ANNALS] (noting that the insanity defense has
been "abused" by the public by its regular denouncement and routine criticisms of the
defense). See generally Rodriguez, LeWinn & Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under
Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Defense Under Siege].
17. A vector is a quantity with both magnitude and direction, See WILSON, GIBBS'
VECTOR ANALYSIS 1 (11th ed. 1952).
18. See generally NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE
(1973).
19. See id. at 70-76.
20. See, e.g., A National Survey: Criminal Defense Systems, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Aug. 1984, at 6-7, 9.
General wisdom to the contrary, the insanity defense appears to be raised more on
behalf of indigent defendants than in the context of a Hinckley type case. See, e.g.,
NISSMAN ET AL., BEATING THE INSANITY DEFENSE: DENYING THE LICENSE TO KILL 2 (1980).
21. The problem of adequacy of counsel in death penalty cases has not, however,
disappeared. A suit was recently filed in Pennsylvania Superior Court charging that the
system of appointment of counsel in death penalty cases in Philadelphia (where Public
Defenders do not provide representation) has led to an inordinately high number of Phi-
ladelphians on death row because of the poor quality of representation provided to such
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Each of these developments has raised multiple and com-
plex questions for the criminal justice system, especially in cases
of indigent mentally disordered offenders 22 charged with serious
crimes for which the death penalty might be sought. What is the
appropriate role of psychiatric testimony in an "ordinary" crimi-
nal case? In a death case? What limits-if any-should there be
on expert testimony in a death case? What qualified counsel
must be provided in order to meet constitutional minima?
Should insanity defense standards and burdens be different in a
death case than in an "ordinary" case? If an indigent criminal
defendant pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity," does she/he
have a right to a psychiatric witness at state expense? Are there
other circumstances under which indigent criminal defendants
have such a right?
In a series of seemingly-unrelated recent cases-Barefoot v.
Estelle,2" Ake v. Oklahoma24 and Strickland v. Washington,25
the Supreme Court has offered some tentative answers to these
questions. At first, the Court's holdings appear inconsistent, al-
most to the point of irreconcilability. However, closer examina-
tion may reveal some overarching principles to provide the glue
of doctrinal cohesion. This article will look at these cases in this
context in an effort to identify the doctrine and articulate its
constitutional and practical underpinnings.
I. THE SCOPE (AND LIMITS) OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE
ROLE (AND PERCEIVED ROLE) OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
It is common wisdom that the insanity defense developed as
it did as a recognition that the state could not put to death a
person not responsible for his acts.26 Even as eminent an author-
defendants. See Woestendiek, ACLU Questions System for Choosing Murder-Trial
Lawyers, Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 23, 1985, § B, at 1.
22. This category includes those perceived as mentally disabled as well as those self-
perceived.
23. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
24. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
25. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
26. See, for a full analysis, Note, Insanity, supra note 4, at 535-37, and sources cited
at nn. 11-22, including, inter alia, 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 395-96; COKE, THIRD
INSTITUTE 4 (London 1644); 1 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (London
1716). See generally Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 17-19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting), and Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9
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ity as Dr. Karl Menninger has argued consistently that the in-
sanity defense has survived solely as a vestigial organ to the
body of capital punishment: "Were capital punishment to be re-
moved, with it would go automatically the absurd insanity de-
fense and the perennial nonsense about sufficient responsibility,
sufficient mentality and sufficient mental health to properly
profit from the vastly expensive hanging or electrocution rit-
ual. '2 7 The leading text on the insanity defense suggests that
"insanity has become something to be asserted only when a
death sentence or very long imprisonment is in the offing.
28
Logically then, when it appeared that capital punishment was
nearing abolition,29 it similarly appeared that "[m]uch of the ur-
gency has gone out of the whole issue of the insanity defense
since the scope of capital punishment has been greatly
curtailed."' 0
This overview, however, appears somewhat wide of the mark
in at least three critical areas. First, historically, the insanity de-
fense has not proven to be an impenetrable bulwark to prevent
execution of the insane.3' Second, while the insanity defense
U.C.L.A. L.REv. 381-89 (1962).
27. MATHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 23 n.4 (1970) (private com-
munication from Dr. Menninger (Dec. 9, 1969)); see generally MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF
PUNISHMENT (1969). Of course, this observation could not possibly predict the sequence
of events to unfold in the United States Supreme Court over the past decade and a half.
As Dean Meltsner has recently noted somewhat wryly: "In my lifetime I have seen the
Constitution rewritten. In one of my specialties, the death penalty, I have seen the law
go from unquestioning acceptance to virtual abolition to virtual unquestioning accept-
ance. And I am still a boy." Meltsner, Wither Legal Education, 30 N.Y.L.SCH. L. REV.
579 (1985).
28. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 24 (1967). Observed Goldstein, "In capital
cases ... the insanity defense may save [the defendant's] life." Id. at 20. See also
KALVEN AND ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 330-31 (1966).
29. For historical overviews of capital punishment, see BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1982); LAURENCE, A HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1960); SCOTT,
THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1950). The path of the pre-Furman cases is elo-
quently drawn in MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT (1974). Cf. Meltsner, supra note 27.
30. L. RUDZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 112.
31. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 29, at 105-08. See generally VOICES AGAINST DEATH:
AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1787-1975, 66-69, 196-97 (Mackey ed.
1976); West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 689
(1975); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950);
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958); Note Insanity, supra note 4.
For a comprehensive history of the law applying to the execution of the insane, see
Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 530-32 (11th Cir. 1985) (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
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may have first developed as a tactical plea to prevent executions,
its use in non-capital cases was well documented as early as the
nineteenth century;32 today its use clearly permeates all levels of
the criminal law from capital cases to misdemeanors.33 Third,
capital punishment simply has not disappeared. If anything, as a
social institution it is probably a stronger force in American so-
ciety than it has been in thirty years.3 4 In short, the insanity
plea has never been a death-case-only plea, and as reports of the
death penalty's demise appear greatly exaggerated, it is likely
that that reason, at least, can no longer be used as a predictor of
the demise of the insanity defense. 5
Given these developments, it appears reasonable that ques-
tions of the reliability of mental health expert testimony and the
permissible scope of such testimony should again occupy center-
stage at the criminal justice/mental health cutting edge, 6 espe-
cially in the Supreme Court's universe of post-Gregg37 death
penalty jurisprudence, where a defendant's potential future dan-
gerousness has been specifically validated as a consideration in
imposing the death penalty. 8 If this prediction is "essential"3 9
to a life-or-death decision, it can be expected that questions as
32. See, e.g., SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE 26 (1981), and cases and sources cited at 185
n.68; The Case of William Spiers: Arson: Plea of Insanity, 15 J. INSANITY 200 (1858).
The Spiers case is also discussed in Fire at the New York State Lunatic Asylum, 14 J.
INSANITY 116 (1857), and Rebuilding of The Asylum at Utica, 15 J. INSANITY 402 (1858).
33. See, e.g., Singer, Insanity Acquittals in the Seventies: Observations and Empiri-
cal Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL Dis. L. REP. 406 n.7 (1978); Defense Under
Siege, supra note 16, at 402 (successful insanity pleas in cases involving writing false
checks, carrying an unloaded starter's pistol and drug use).
34. See generally Bedau, supra note 29, at 3-95.
35. Other countervailing social and legal factors, however, may limit the use of the
plea. See, e.g., Singer, The Aftermath of An Insanity Acquittal: The Supreme Court's
Recent Decision in Jones v. United States, ANNALS supra note 16, at 114 (Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), will likely result in a significant drop in the number
of insanity pleas); Hinckley's Trial, supra note 15 at 861 (impact of Hinckley acquittal
on subsequent federal legislation geared to curtail the use of the defense); Slovenko, The
Insanity Defense in. the Wake of the Hinckley Trial, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 373, 395 (1983)
("following the uproar over the Hinckley verdict, jurors will be less likely to return
NGRI [not guilty by reason of insanity] verdicts and psychiatrists will be less willing to
take part in the judicial process").
36. Defense Under Siege, supra note 16, at 397; see also Rodriguez Testifies on New
Jersey's Insanity Defense, 110 N.J.L.J. 453, 473 (1982).
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
38. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976) (Stevens, J., opinion).
39. Id. at 275.
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to possible limitations on the legitimacy of expertise in this area
would be carefully scrutinized.
In considering responses to these questions, it is clear that
the literature on the limits of the reliability of psychiatric pre-
dictive testimony is voluminous 0 and relatively unchallenged. '
The American Psychiatric Association has stated flatly that the
"unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dan-
gerousness is by now an established fact within the profes-
sion."42 Surveys of empirical data are consistent: "the ability of
psychiatrists . . . to reliably predict future violence is un-
proved"43; "the professional literature demonstrate[s] no reliable
criteria for psychiatric predictions of long-term future criminal
behavior";"" the best clinical research currently in existence indi-
cates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no
more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a
several year period."
40. For a sampling of the extensive literature see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and
the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693
(1974); STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 27-36 (1975); Dia-
mond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974);
MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1084 (1976). Interestingly, a recent critical article which analyzes research meth-
odologies employed in these and other "classic" studies of the area, and determines that
the "current depictions of the research on dangerousness predictions exaggerate their
inaccuracy," concludes: "[R]ead in their best light, the data suggest that [no] method of
prediction provides information that will permit an accurate designation of a 'high risk'
group whose members have more than a forty or fifty percent chance of committing
serious assaultive behavior." Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
97, 126 (1984).
41. But see Haddad, Predicting the Supreme Court's Response to the Criticism of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 64 NEB. L.
REV. 215, 246 (1985) (characterizing testimony as "useful and sufficiently reliable"); cf.
Mulvey & Litz, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of Dangerousness Research in a New
Legal Environment, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 217 (1985) (calling for "document[ation of]
the prediction process as it actually occurs").
42. Amicus Brief of American Psychiatric Ass'n at 12, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880 (1983) [hereinafter cited as APA Barefoot Brief]. This position is similar to one
taken by the American Psychological Ass'n. See Report of the Task Force on the Role of
Psychology in the Criminal Justice System, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978).
43. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVID-
UAL 30 (1974).
44. APA Barefoot Brief, supra note 42, at 13 (citing STONE, supra note 40, at 29).
45. MONAHAN, supra note 40, at 49; see also, e.g., Pfohl, Predicting Dangerousness: A
Social Deconstruction of Psychiatric Reality, in MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
201, 220 (Teplin ed. 1984):
[Vol. III
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Given this inability to accurately predict dangerousness, it
is, as Professor Slobogin notes,4 "ironic" that the Supreme
Court now appears to enthusiastically endorse continued reli-
ance on this sort of testimony in death penalty litigation 47 and
elsewhereS in spite of the growing awareness that mental health
An analysis of the methodological procedures of this clinical science suggests
that its claim to predictive expertise is empirically unwarranted. Past research
on predictive outcomes suggests that at its best, it falsely overestimates violence
in approximately two out of three cases. My own research on how clinical read-
ings of future violence are conducted suggests reasons for this inaccuracy. Diag-
nostic judgments are seen as contingent on a complex process of social interac-
tion whereby clinicians construct theories about the future lives of patients
based on present readings of past records. These clinical readings are subse-
quently expanded, modified, and justified as clinicians selectively guide the
structure of psychiatric interviews and negotiate with each other over such mat-
ters as deferential status and the practical and political consequences of making
a particular diagnosis. In the long run, however, all that clinicians do concretely
is cloaked in the objective-sounding language of their final diagnostic report. In
this text a multiplicity of social factors are reduced to an argot of individualized
pathology. This is the most important political consequence of the diagnostic
process. Past, present, and future behaviors are wrenched from their social con-
text and made over into simple, believable stories of personalized disease and
biographical maladjustment.
cf. Jeffrey, Criminal Law and the Medical Model, in ATTACKS ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE
176, 200 (Jeffrey ed. 1985), suggesting that methodology of predicting dangerousness be
abandoned, and "more scientific procedures, including biological and neurological [proce-
dures]" be substituted, recommending use, inter alia, of "the CAT scan, PETT scan,
NMR scan . . . [and] hair analysis."
46. Slobogin, supra note 40, at 98.
47. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473
(1981) (in the course of opinion holding that defendant's privilege against compelled self-
incrimination was violated where psychiatrist who had examined defendant on compe-
tence issue testified at death penalty hearing without having warned defendant that
statements could be so used against him, the Supreme Court noted it was "in no sense
disapproving the use of psychiatric testimony bearing on the issue of future dangerous-
ness"); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 n.16 (1983).
48. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (implying that psychiatric testi-
mony on dangerousness is admissible in subsequent commitment proceedings for defend-
ants found NGRI); cf. State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1978), and see State v.
Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 310, 390 A.2d 574, 588 (1978) (emphasis in original):
Each review proceeding, periodic or otherwise, should be a comprehensive
evaluation of all evidence pertaining to the committee's mental illness and po-
tential dangerousness by reason thereof. Although the purpose of each review
hearing is the assessment of the committee's current condition and the conse-
quent need for restrictions upon his liberty as a matter of community or individ-
ual protection, all prior evidence, both factual and expert, pertaining to those
issues remains relevant . . . . The reviewing judge must evaluate the current
evidence submitted to him in light of all evidence adduced in earlier proceed-
ings. The committee does not enter each review proceeding with a clean slate,
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professionals lack expert capacity in this area."9 This tension has
led inevitably to considerable debate over the scope of admissi-
bility of such expert testimony. Should the status quo be contin-
ued?50 Should the scope of the expert's testimony be limited to
statements of mental condition?"' Should an expert only be per-
although certainly the passage of time might diminish the relevancy of certain
expert diagnostic evidence to the point where it may be insignificant. The accu-
racy of the reviewing judge's evaluation of the committee's probable dangerous-
ness will be greatly enhanced by ensuring that he has the maximum amount of
relevant information concerning the committee at his disposal.
49. See, e.g., Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary
and Constitutional Considerations, 19 AM. CraM. L. REV. 47 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Dix, Expert Prediction] ("To the extent that support exists in the case law for a due
process bar against the use of some types of exceptionally unreliable evidence, expert
testimony by mental health professionals concerning capital defendants' dangerousness
is a prime candidate for constitutionally-compelled exclusion"); see also Bonnie, Psychi-
atry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 167 (1980);
Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process:
The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427 (1980).
50. As the Supreme Court noted:
If the likelihood of a defendant committing further crimes is a constitution-
ally acceptable criterion for imposing the death penalty, which it is, . . . it is not
impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion, it makes
little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of
persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the
subject that they should not be permitted to testify.
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983) (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262).
51. Congress has recently amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to limit expert
testimony in insanity cases. Under the new rule, "no expert witness testifying with re-
spect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an
opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone." FED. R. Evm. 704(b)(1984). The
legislative history of this amendment is crystal-clear: "The purpose of this amendment is
to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly
contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact."
Continuing Appropriations, 1985-Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, P.L. No.
98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 3412-13. The committee report
quoted from the American Psychiatric Associations's Statement on the Insanity Defense:
When... "ultimate issue" questions are formulated by the law and put to
the expert witness who must then say "yea" or "nay," then the expert witness is
required to make a leap in logic. He no longer addresses himself to medical con-
cepts but instead must infer or intuit what is in fact inseparable, namely, the
probable relationship between medical concepts and legal or moral constructs
such as free will.
Id. at 3413.
This limitation is in accord with recent recommendations suggesting that such testi-
mony "cannot be considered dispositive." Defense Under Siege, supra note 16, at 425;
see also, e.g. Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in Texas: Psychotherapists' Con-
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mitted to testify if he explains fully-via a "publicly demonstra-
ble test"-how he arrived at his diagnosis and conclusion, or if
he states his diagnosis "as an organic whole arrived at upon...
the application of. . .contemporary scientific investigatory de-
vices"?1 2 Does requiring the expert to state an opinion on the
ultimate issue of responsibility "place" him in the role of moral
decision maker?"3
This issue came to a head in the Supreme Court two terms
ago in Barefoot v. Estelle.4 While the decision's "trickle-down"
impact on this point has not yet been particularly profound, 5 its
jurisprudential approach to the issues in question is important,
as a reflection of its overwhelming ambivalence towards psychi-
atric expert testimony,56 as an example of its irritation at the use
of multiple habeas corpus petitions as a tool to thwart the impo-
sition of the death penalty,6 7 and as an example-ultimately-of
flicting Duties, Their Potential Liability, and Possible Solutions, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 141,
155 (1980); Note, A Ship of Fools: Contemporary Legal Attitudes Toward the Mentally
Disordered Criminal Defendant. 52 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 443, 459-461 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Ship of Fools]. But cf. Haddad, supra note 41, at 238-247.
52. Ship of Fools, supra note 51, at 460 (citing SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY
130 (1963), and GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 42-43 (1962)).
53. Ship of Fools, supra note 51, at 461 n.104 (citing Comments of Professor [Sey-
mour] Halleck before the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 82 F.R.D.
217, 305 (1978).
54. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
55. In the nearly two years since Barefoot's decision, it has been cited by lower courts
on questions of validity of psychiatric predictions less than a handful of times, see, e.g.,
United States v. Toriero, 735 F.2d 725, 734 (2d Cir. 1984); State v. Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 313
S.E.2d 619, (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1984), and on the court's use (or non use) of social science
empirical studies as to legislative facts only once, Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718
F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983); see also State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 477 A.2d 308
(1984), discussed infra text accompanying note 189.
On the Supreme Court's view of this point, see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
365 n.13 (1983): "We do not agree with the suggestion that Congress' power to legislate
in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric community." For an
analysis of how the current court "improperly manipulates constitutional fact through
the use of a variety of devices, including a selective negativism and disregard of facts,
alternated with the suspension of disbelief," see Shaman, Constitutional Fact: The Per-
ception of Reality by the Supreme Court, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 236, 252 (1983); see also
SALES & HAFEMEISTER, EMPIRICISM AND LEGAL POLICY ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 253 (Teplin ed. 1984) ("Clearly, the misuse and nonuse of
relevant social scientific information by legislators is a critical issue that begs for system-
atic study"); SAKS & BARON, THE USE, NONUSE, MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN
THE COURTS (1980).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 463-506.
57. "With each Supueme Court decision denying a challenge to a particular state's
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its attitude towards the possibility of potential error in capital
sentencing.5 8
Thomas Barefoot was convicted in 1978 of murdering a
Texas police officer.5 9 Under the penalty phase procedures em-
ployed by Texas,60 the sentencing jury was asked two specific
questions:
(1) was the conduct which caused death "committed de-
liberately and with the reasonable expectation that death
. ..would result,"61 and (2) was there a "probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society"
62
death penalty statute, the universe of federal issues shrinks dramatically." Rodriguez,
Perlin & Apicella, Proportionality Review in New Jersey: An Indispensable Safeguard
in the Capital Sentencing Process, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 417 n. 121 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Proportionality Review], referring to Greenhouse, As Appeals Hit Final Stage,
Life on Death Row Runs Out, New York Times, Dec. 18, 1983, § E, at 5. That universe
has shrunk even further since the preparation of the Proportionality Review article, in
light of the Court's more recent decisions in Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985)
(FDA's decision not to take enforcement action to prevent use of drugs to carry out
capital punishment not subject to review), and Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S.Ct 844 (1985)
(limiting holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) on exclusion of jurors for
cause in capital punishment trial). But cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 182-290.
Compare Justice Rehnquist's lament that the death penalty appeals process has
made the existence of the penalty "virtually an illusion," Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S.
949,958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari), with Justice Bren-
nan's complaint that the Court's acceptance of expedited appeal procedures displays "an
unseemly and unjustified eagerness to allow the state to proceed with [defendant's] exe-
cution," Maggio v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 311, 317 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) has been sharply criticized for demon-
strating "a new willingness to tolerate significant potential error in capital sentencing,"
The Supreme Court: 1982 Term, HARV. L. REv. 70, 121 (1983), for relying on an "almost
mechanistic invocation of an idealized adversary process," id. at n.28, and for "disre-
gard[ing] ...the entire framework of evidentiary law," id. at 121. Along with two other
death penalty cases decided in the same term-Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983),
and Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983)-Barefoot was characterized as "ac-
quiesc[ing] in a sentencing procedure that reflects neither the highest standards of relia-
bility in decision-making nor the exercise of discretion according to clear and consistent
criteria." Id. at 127.
59. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 883 (1983).
60. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
61. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. § 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon 1981).
62. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981).
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At the penalty phase, the state called two psychiatrists-Dr.
Holbrook and the now infamous Dr. Grigsone-who, in response
to hypothetical questions, testified that defendant "would prob-
ably commit further acts of violence and represent a continuing
threat to society."'6 The jury subsequently answered both spe-
cial questions in the affirmative, 65 "a result which required the
imposition of the death penalty."6
On his state court appeal, defendant argued (1) that the use
of psychiatrists at the death penalty hearing to make predictions
about his likely future conduct was unconstitutional because
psychiatrists-individually and as a class-were not competent
to predict future dangerousness, and (2) that permitting answers
to hypotheticals by psychiatrists who did not personally examine
a defendant was constitutional error.67 Both arguments were re-
jected, and the conviction was affirmed. 8 Defendant subse-
quently filed a federal habeas corpus petition,69 raising, inter
63. Dr. Grigson has testified regarding defendant's dangerousness in more than 70
capital sentencing hearings, all but one of which has resulted in imposition of the death
sentence. Ewing, 'Dr. Death' and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychological Predic-
tions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 Am. J. L. & MED. 407, 410
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Ewing, 'Dr. Death']; see generally, ROB1TSCHER, THE POWER
OF PSYCHIATRY 198-207 (1980). Dr. Grigson is profiled in They Call Him Dr. Death,
Time, June 1, 1981, at 64; Taylor, Dallas Doctor of Doom, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 24, 1980, at 1,
and Bloom, Killers and Shrinks, Texas Monthly, July, 1978, at 64.
For an analysis of a dozen Texas capital cases in which Dr. Grigson testified, see
Dix, Participation by Mental Health Professionals in Capital Murder Sentencing, 1
INT'L J. L. & PSYCH. 283 n.48 (1978); Dix, Expert Prediction, supra note 49, at 4 n.19; see
generally Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testimony and Pro-
fessional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151 (1977); see also, Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the
'Dangerousness' of 'Normal' Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REv. 523 (1980).
For a detailed analysis of a pre-Barefoot Texas death penalty trial concluding that
the state's trial courts have used expert mental health testimony in a "woefully inade-
quate manner" at the penalty phase, see Dix, Administration of the Texas Death Pen-
alty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 57
TEX. L. REv. 1343, 1399 (1977) (characterizing the state criminal appeals court's "failure
. . . to scrutinize [such testimony] more diligently" as "discouraging," id. at 1316).
64. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884.
65. See TEx. CODE CrIM. PROc. ANN. § 37.071(c) (Vernon 1981).
66. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884-85.
67. Id. at 885.
68. State v. Barefoot, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
69. This petition followed an earlier grant of a stay of execution by the Supreme
Court, pending filing and disposition of defendant's petition for certiorari from the state
court's final decision. The petition was filed and then denied. See Barefoot v. Texas, 453
U.S. 913 (1981).
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alia, the same claims as had been rejected by the state courts.7 0
Following an evidentiary hearing, defendant's writ was denied."
After a lengthy and complex series of procedural maneuvers, ap-
parently designed to assure a stay of defendant's death sentence
while the constitutional question was being considered,72 the
fifth circuit similarly rejected defendant's arguments.7 The Su-
preme Court again stayed the execution and granted certiorari
on both the psychiatric issue and the question of the "appropri-
ate standard for granting or denying a stay of execution pending
disposition of an appeal by a federal court of appeals by a death-
sentenced habeas corpus petitioner.
'74
The Supreme Court affirmed,75 holding initially that a
habeas corpus petitioner must make a "substantial showing of
the denial of a federal right, '7' and that, while a circuit court,
"where necessary to prevent the case from becoming moot by
the petitioner's execution, should grant a stay of execution"
pending appellate disposition, "when a condemned prisoner ob-
tains a certificate of probable cause on his initial appeal, 7 7 a
court of appeals "may adopt expedited procedures in resolving
the merits of habeas appeals.
'78
The Court then proceeded to defendant's "merits submis-
sion,' '7 9 and characterized his tripartite claim in this way:
70. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 885. (1983).
71. Id. at 886.
72. Id. at 887.
73. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 596-98 (5th Cir. 1983).
74. Barefoot v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).
75. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983).
76. Id. at 893-94 (quoting Stewart v. Beto, 454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert,
denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972)).
77. Id. at 894.
78. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also held that a "successor" petition "may be
dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief...
[or if] the failure of the petitioner to assert these grounds in a prior petition constituted
abuse of the writ," id. at 895 (quoting Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
and that stays of execution "are not automatic pending the filing and consideration of a
petition for a writ of certiorari"), for a stay to be granted there "must be a reasonable
probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue suffi-
ciently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction;
there must be a significant possibility of reversal that irreparable harm would result if
the decision is not stayed," id. (quoting White v. Florida, 463 U.S. 1229 (Powell, J.,
chambers opinion), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982)).
79. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
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First, it is urged that psychiatrists, individually and as a
group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable de-
gree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit
other crimes in the future and so represent a danger to
the community. Second, it is said that in any event, psy-
chiatrists should not be permitted to testify about future
dangerousness in response to hypothetical questions and
without having examined the defendant personally.
Third, it is argued that in the particular circumstances in
this case the testimony of the psychiatrists was so unreli-
able that the sentence should be set aside."0
The Court, per Justice White, rejected defendant's first
point by paraphrasing his suggestion as "somewhat like asking
us to disinvent the wheel."'" It characterized the argument as
"contrary to our cases, "82 relying on Jurek v. Texas83 to support
the proposition that medical testimony on dangerousness should
be admissible. 4 The Court asserted "it makes little sense, if any,
to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of per-
sons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so
little about the subject that they should not be permitted to tes-
tify. 8 5 Beyond this, defendant's argument would "immediately
call into question those other contexts in which predictions of
future behavior are constantly made.
'8 6
Further, the Court noted that the rules of evidence gener-
ally allow relevant testimony to be admitted into evidence with
the appropriate weight to be allocated by the fact-finder "who
would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evi-
dence by the opposing party. 8 7 Psychiatric testimony on predic-
tions of dangerousness may be countered as erroneous in a par-
ticular case, or may be characterized as generally unreliable, but




83. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
84. See supra note 50.
85. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897.
86. Id. at 898. The Court on this point cited O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975), and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
87. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898.
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issues.88
The Court also rejected the views presented in the amicus
brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association: (1) such tes-
timony was invalid because of its "fundamentally low reliabil-
ity""9 (thus undermining the integrity of the fact-finding pro-
cess), and (2) long-term prediction of future dangerousness is an
"essentially lay determination that should be based not on diag-
nosis and opinions of medical experts, but on the basis of predic-
tive statistical or actuarial information that is fundamentally
nonmedical in nature."90
First, the Court relied on its recent decision in Estelie v.
Smith9' in which it stated that, while a defendant had fifth and
sixth amendment rights to meaningfully exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination and to the assistance of counsel prior
to submitting to a psychiatric interview which the state could
use as the basis of testimony at the penalty phase of a capital
case,9" this decision in "no sense disapprov[ed] the use of psy-
chiatric testimony bearing on future dangerousness. "93 In addi-
88. Id. at 898-99 (emphasis added). The Court noted that there was no evidence of-
fered by the defendant to contradict the state doctors' testimony, id. n.5, but also
pointed out that, despite defendant's indigence, there was no contention that the court
refused to provide an expert for the defendant (as then mandated by Texas state law).
Id., citing TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., Art. 26.05(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982). Cf. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 182-290.
89. APA Barefoot brief, supra note 42, at 14.
90. Id. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983). In an interesting footnote,
id. at n.6, the Court denied the persuasiveness of several cases cited by the dis-
sent-including, inter alia, United States v. Kilgus, 517 F. 2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978),
United States v. Brown, 557 F. 2d 541, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1977), and United States v.
Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 1331
(9th Cir. 1977), Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931 n.9 (Blackmun, J. dissenting)-as
rejecting certain other sorts of "scientific proof" (e.g., hair identification; psycholinguis-
tics) as admissible because those cases were decisions based on federal evidence law and
not on the constitution. Id. at 899 n.6 (emphasis added).
91. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
92. Id. at 468-73.
93. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898, quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473
(1981). For a post-Barefoot analysis of Smith, see Note, Psychiatric Testimony and the
Issue of Future Dangerousness, 20 HOUSTON L. REV. 1179 (1983). Professor Dix argues
persuasively that in neither Smith nor Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding
Texas' death penalty procedures), was "the fundamental issue presented by the Smith
facts [addressed]: the constitutional acceptability of psychiatric prediction testimony in
capital sentencing proceedings." Dix, Expert Prediction, supra note 49, at 4 (footnote
omitted).
Two other similarities between Smith and Barefoot are noteworthy: The American
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tion, the Court reasoned, there are psychiatrists willing to testify
as to such future dangerousness; 94 "if they are so obviously
wrong and should be discredited, there should be no insuperable
problem in doing so by calling members of the [American Psy-
chiatric] Association who are of that view and who confidently
assert their opinion in the amicus brief.
'95
On this point, the Court stressed that it was "unconvinced
. . . at least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be
trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and
opinions about future dangerousness, particularly when [defend-
ant] has the opportunity to present his own side of the case. '"96
It rejected what it characterized as the premise of Justice Black-
mun's dissent-"that a jury will not be able to separate the
wheat from the chaff"-stating that "we do not share in this low
evaluation of the adversary process.
'97
On the second question concerning the propriety of the use
of hypotheticals in such circumstances, the Court simply held
that "expert testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based
on hypothetical questions or otherwise, is commonly admitted as
evidence where it might help the fact finder do its assigned
job."" The Court further endorsed the position taken by the
Psychiatric Association filed an amicus brief in Smith arguing that "the use of psychiat-
ric testimony in a capital case on the issue of whether a defendant is likely to commit
serious crimes in the future is constitutionally invalid because it undermines the reliabil-
ity of the factfinding process," Estelle v. Smith, No. 79-1127, Brief of Amicus APA, at 11
(1981); and, the sole expert witness at the sentencing hearing in Smith was Dr. Grigson.
Dix, Expert Prediction, supra note 49, at 2 n.5.
94. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 900-01.
96. Id. at 901. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1095-97 (1985).
97. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899 n.7. In the same footnote the majority cites Dr.
Monahan's studies that experts are inaccurate in predictions of future violence two out
of three times, MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981),
but notes that Dr. Monahan also felt that "there may be circumstances in which predic-
tion is both empirically possible and ethically appropriate." Id. at v.
98. 463 U.S. at 903. In support of this proposition the Court cited four nineteenth
century cases: Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645 (1879); Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9, 21 L.
Ed. 73 (1872); Forsythe v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73 (1877); and Braun v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897).
The Court noted that the commentary to the Federal Rules of Evidence "touch[es]
on the particular objections to hypothetical questions," but lends no support to defend-
ant's argument. 463 U.S. at 904. The Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Evid. 705 (not
mentioned in the decision) states that "the hypothetical question has been the target of
a great deal of criticism as encouraging partisan bias," FED. R. EVID. 705.3 advisory com-
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Barefoot: "that the experts
had not examined [defendant] went to the weight of their testi-
mony, not to its admissibility." 9
Finally, on the application of those rules to the instant case,
defendant had argued that the psychiatrists should not have
been permitted to give opinion evidence on the ultimate issue
before the jury where the hypothetical was phrased in terms of
defendant's conduct, in a context where the hypothetical facts
and the psychiatrists' answers were so positive as to be asser-
tions of facts, not opinions. 00 The Court rejected all these argu-
ments, noting that the defendant could have propounded his
own hypothetical based on his version of the facts, '01 and that,
the more certain an expert is about prediction, the easier it
should be to impeach him.'
02
In a sharply-worded dissent, Justice Blackmun (speaking
mittee note, an observation probably a bit more pointed than a mere "touch[ing] on."
99. State v. Barefoot, 596 S.W.2d 875, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), quoted in Bare-
foot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 904 (1983).
While the hypothetical question first came to prominence in M'Naghten, its use pre-
dates that case by nearly a century. See, e.g., Earl Fenners' Trial, 19 How. St. Trials 943
(1760); Lord Melville's Trial, 29 How. St. Trials 1065 (1806); its first recorded use in an
American jurisdiction was apparently in State v. Powell, 7 N.J.L. 249 (1824); see gener-
ally, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 792-95 (3d. ed. 1940). The matter is discussed fully in Quen,
The Hypothetical and the Ultimate Questions: Their Historical Relationship, Part II,
10 NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 17 (1985).
At least one eminent psychiatrist has noted that, when evaluated according to con-
temporary criteria for antisocial personality disorder ("sociopathy"), by its own terms,
the hypothetical employed in Barefoot "failed to provide a determination of whether any
of the three requirements for the diagnosis had been met." Applebaum, Death, the Ex-
pert Witness, and the Dangers of Going Barefoot, 34 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCH. 1003,
1004 (1983). See also, Green, Capital Punishment, Psychiatric Experts, and Predictions
of Dangerousness, 13 CAPITAL L. REv. 535, 550-51 (1983-84) (Hypothetical failed to com-
ply with criterion of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III; Barefoot's endorsement of
such hypothetical "will undoubtedly prejudice the defendant").
100. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 904-05.
101. Id. at 905 n.10.
102. Id. n.11.
The more certain a state expert is about his prediction, the easier it is for
the defendant to impeach him. For example, in response to Dr. Grigson's asser-
tion that he was "100% sure" that an individual with the characteristics of the
one in the hypothetical would commit acts of violence in the future, Dr. Fason
testified at the habeas hearing that if a doctor claimed to be 100% sure of some-
thing without examining the patient, "we would kick him off the staff of the
hospital for his arrogance."
H. Tr. 48. Similar testimony could have been presented at Barefoot's trial, but was not.
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for himself and for Justices Marshall and Brennan) rejected the
majority's views on the psychiatric issue:1°'
The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a de-
fendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the
fact that such testimony is wrong two times out of three.
The Court reaches this result-even in a capital
case-because, it is said, the testimony is subject to
cross-examination and impeachment. In the present state
of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One
may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages,
but when a person's life is at stake-no matter how hei-
nous his offense-a requirement of greater reliability
should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony
of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable
jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical spe-
cialist's words, equates with death itself.104
After reviewing the psychiatric testimony, 03 Justice Black-
mun cited extensively from the APA amicus brief in support of
several propositions: (1) "Neither the Court nor the State of
Texas has cited a single reputable scientific source contradicting
the unanimous conclusion of professionals in this field that psy-
chiatric predictions of long-term future violence are wrong more
often than they are right"; 0 6 (2) "psychiatrists simply have no
expertise in predicting long-term future dangerousness,' 0 7 a
"layman with access to relevant statistics can do at least as well
and possibly better"; 10 8 (3) "the scientific literature makes crys-
103. Id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concurred with the judg-
ment of the court, id. at 906; Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the issue of
the appropriate procedures to follow in capital cases. Id. at 906 (Marshall, J., and Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 916.
105. Id. at 917-19. Both Drs. Holbrook and Grigson testified to a "reasonable psychi-
atric certainty" that the defendant was a "criminal sociopath" (Holbrook), suffering
from a "classical, typical, sociopathic personality disorder" (Grigson). Grigson testified
that, on sociopathy scale of one to ten, defendant was "above ten," and that there was a
"one hundred percent and absolute" chance defendant would commit future acts of
criminal violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id. (quoting trial
transcript).
106. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 917 (1983) (see also sources cited at n.2).
107. Id. at 918 (see also sources cited at n.3).
108. Id. (see also sources cited at n.4).
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tal-clear that [Drs. Holbrook and Grigson] had no expertise
whatever";10 9 and (4) "it is impossible to square admission of
this purportedly scientific but actually baseless testimony with
the Constitution's paramount concern for reliability in capital
sentencing. "110
Given this backdrop, Justice Blackmun concluded that such
"unreliable scientific evidence is widely acknowledged to be prej-
udicial," '11 as "'an aura of scientific infallibility' may shroud the
evidence and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scru-
tiny."1 12 The court's interest in "encouraging the introduction of
a wide scope of evidence"'1 3 is an interest in "accurate informa-
tion""'-there is no interest "in providing deceptive and inaccu-
rate testimony to the jury." ' While the Court trusts the adver-
sary process to "sort out the reliable from the unreliable,"' I
Justice Blackmun openly speculated as to how "juries are to sep-
arate valid from invalid expert opinions when the 'experts'
themselves are so obviously unable to do so.1117 In his view,
opinion evidence should not be admissible "if the court believes
that the state of the pertinent art of scientific knowledge does
not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted."11 8 "When the
court knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of danger-
ousness are specious, there can be no excuse for imposing on the
defendant, on pain of his life, the heavy burden of convincing a
109. Id. (see also sources cited at n.5). "A death sentence cannot rest on the highly
dubious predictions secretly based on a factual foundation of hearsay and pure conjec-
ture." Id. at 919 n.5.
110. Id. at 919 (see also sources cited at n.6).
111. Id.
112. Id., quoting Gianelli, The Inadmissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (1980). See also,
sources cited at Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919 n.8 (1983).
113. Id. at 920, relying on Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983).
114 Id. relying on Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976), California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).
115. Ramos at 1001.
116. Id. at 921, quoting id. at 899.
117. Id.
118. Id., quoting McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 31 (1972). Cross-examination is not "an anti-
dote for this distortion of the truthfinding process ... [because it] is unlikely to reveal
the fatuousness of psychiatric predictions [which] rest ... on psychiatric categories and
intuitive clinical judgment [that are] not susceptible to cross-examination and rebuttal."
Id. at 932, citing Dix, Expert Prediction supra note 49, at 44.
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jury of laymen of the fraud."11
Barefoot appears to be indefensible on evidentiary grounds,
on constitutional grounds and on common sense grounds. It flies
in the face of virtually all of the relevant scientific literature. It
is inconsistent with the development of evidence law doctrine,
and it makes a mockery of earlier Supreme Court decisions cau-
tioning that extra reliability is needed in capital casbs. 120 In the
words of Dr. Paul Appelbaum, it is an example of "tortuous
[reasoning] in the extreme, ' 121 reflecting "factual inconsistency
in the service of a transcendent ideological goal.
122
First, as Justice Blackmun stressed, the testimony did not
meet the stringent criteria 2 ' demanded by the lead case of Frye
119. Id. at 924.
120. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Jus-
tices Stewart, Powell and Stevens).
121. Dr. Appelbaum Replies, 142 AM. J. PSYCH. 387, 388 (1985). Appelbaum had set
out his view on the current Court in an earlier article:
Not only does the Court's agenda transcend psychiatry, but the Court is
willing to mold its image of psychiatry in whatever way is useful in fulfilling its
goals. Among these goals, clearly, is a desire to limit judicial involvement in in-
stitutional affairs, reserving the time and energies of the courts, and their capac-
ity for objective evaluation, for more traditional adjudicatory roles.
Appelbaum, The Supreme Court Looks at Psychiatry, 141 AM. J. PSYCH. 827, 834 (1984).
In a subsequent response to a letter to the editor, Dr. Appelbaum amplified on these
remarks.
As I noted in the paper, and this may be the most difficult message for
psychiatrists to hear, the Court's agenda is not identical to psychiatry's agenda.
In pursuit of broader aims-especially efforts to restrain the activist tendencies
of the lower federal judiciary, but with other factors also playing an important
role-the Court will move closer to and further from our positions, as it suits the
Court's needs.
An example of this can be seen in a case that postdates my paper, Barefoot
v. Estelle, in which the Court was asked to restrict the use of psychiatric predic-
tions of dangerousness at death penalty hearings. Focusing solely on the Court's
previous expressions of doubt about the accuracy of psychiatric determinations,
reviewed in my paper, one might have expected a firm rejection of inherently
inaccurate psychiatric prognostications in a setting in which predictive accuracy
is literally a life-and-death matter. Viewing the case as another in a long line of
liberal challenges to death penalty proceedings, the Court supported the contin-
uing use of psychiatrists to predict future dangerousness, thus sending the mes-
sage down the line that it would look with disfavor on further efforts to impede
application of the death penalty. As noted in the dissent in Barefoot, the
Court's reasoning was tortuous in the extreme. Yet its behavior becomes expli-
cable when the Court's real agenda is exposed.
Id. (emphasis added).
122. Appelbaum, supra note 121, at 831.
123. Much of the material in this section is adapted from Defense Under Siege,
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v. United States,12 4 the "seminal case on scientific evidence."' 12 5
Even where a witness has "peculiar knowledge or experience not
common to the world,"'126 such an expert "cannot indulge in
mere speculation or surmise."'21 7 In areas where there is far
greater reliability than in predictivity of dangerousness, 2 ' where
there is greater accord as to witness' peculiar skills in forming
opinions and far greater acceptance of techniques within the sci-
entific community as to a test's accuracy, such testimony is al-
most invariably excluded.
2 9
The first-and leading-case to focus the test for admissi-
bility of scientific evidence on the concept of "general accept-
ance in the particular field in which it belongs" was Frye.5 0 In
considering the reliability of expert testimony used to interpret
the results of the forerunner of the modern polygraph, the Frye
court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testi-
mony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.' 3'
supra note 16, at 420-25.
124. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
125. State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 517, 443 A.2d 1020, 1024 (1978).
126. Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 142, 72 A.2d 204, 207 (1950).
New Jersey's case law on this point reflects the majority rule of most American jurisdic-
tions. See generally, 7 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (1978), §§ 1917-1929 at 1-43.
127. Rempfer, at 144-45, 72 A.2d at 208.
128. E.g., lie detectors, voice prints, truth sera.
129. Defense Under Siege, supra note 16, at 421. See sources cited at id. n.151. See,
e.g., Hake v. Manchester Twp., 98 N.J. 302, 313, 486 A.2d 836, 843 (1985).
The test of the need for expert testimony is whether the matter is so eso-
teric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid judg-
ment as to the fact in issue . . . . What we look for from the witness is the
minimal technical training and knowledge essential to the expression of a mean-
ingful and reliable opinion. ...
Id. (citations omitted).
130. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
131. Id. For a survey of earlier "scientific" methodologies used to determine truth
and allocate blame in the criminal process in other civilizations, see REIK, THE UNKNOWN
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The Frye test has been applied in an ever-increasing range
of expert testimony challenges. 132 Although it remains the "ma-
jority rule, '133 it has been called into question by other courts
suggesting that scientific evidence should be treated "in the
same way that other evidence is treated, weighing its probative
value against countervailing dangers and considerations.
13 4
However, even with the use of such a formula, the testimony in
Barefoot would still fail to pass muster.1 3
5
MURDERER, 128-32 (Jones trans., 1945) (African and Australian tribal practices).
132. See Thomas, ed., Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D.
187, 189-90 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
Contemporaneously, Frye has been relied upon in assessing challenges to, inter alia,
multi-system enzyme blood testing, see e.g., State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 53, 622
P.2d 986, 991 (1981); "battered wife" syndrome, State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 521,
423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981); fingernail comparisons, People v. Wesley, 103 Mich. App.
240, 246, 303 N.W.2d 194, 196 (1981); the "rape trauma" syndrome, State v. Marks, 231
Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982); and linguistics analysis, United States v. Clif-
ford, 543 F.Supp. 424, 430 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
133. Symposium, supra note 132, at 198.
134. Id. at 194.
135. Compare, for these purposes, the seven factors identified by Judge Weinstein
and Professor Berger as relevant to a court's consideration in assessing the probative
value of scientific evidence with the eleven factors identified. by Professor McCormick for
the same purpose:
Weinstein and Berger
(1) the technique's general acceptance in the field, (2) the expert's qualifica-
tions and stature, (3) the use which has been made of the new technique, (4) the
potential rate of error, (5) the existence of specialized literature, (6) the novelty
of the new invention, and (7) the extent to which the technique relies on the
subjective interpretation of the expert. 3 WEINSTEIN AND BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 702-19 (1982) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN]), cited in Symposium, supra
note 132, at 194.
McCormick
(1) the potential error rate using the technique, (2) the existence and main-
tenance of standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in the charac-
teristics of the technique, (4) the analogy to other scientific techniques whose
results are admissible, (5) the extent to which the technique has been accepted
by scientists in the field involved, (6) the nature and breadth of the inference
adduced, (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be de-
scribed and its results explained, (8) the extent to which the basic data are veri-
fiable by the court and jury, (9) the availability of other experts to test and
evaluate the technique, (10) the probative significance of the evidence in the
circumstances of the case, and (11) the care with which the technique was em-
ployed in the case. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach
to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982), cited in Symposium, supra
note 132, at 194.
The Symposium article then proceeds to note two problems with the relevancy approach
to admissibility: (1) "in determining the probative value ...of scientific evidence, the
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These issues were recently examined in State v. Cavallo,3'e
a New Jersey Supreme Court case involving a challenge to psy-
chiatric expert testimony. The defense offered a psychiatrist to
testify as to his familiarity with the characteristics exhibited by
rapists, and his expert opinion that such characteristics were
completely absent in the defendant. 137 In affirming the trial
judge's refusal to allow this testimony, the state supreme court
specifically rejected defendant's contention that "considerations
of reliability should determine the weight accorded to scientific
testimony, not its admissibility. '"13s The court stated:
The danger through introduction of unreliable expert evi-
dence is clear. While juries would not always accord ex-
cessive weight to unreliable expert testimony, there is
substantial danger that they would do so, precisely be-
cause this evidence is labeled "scientific" and "expert.' 13 9
Moreover, the court predicted a "'battle of the experts' on the
validity of the expert evidence," if the proffered testimony were
allowed, stating: "In so subjective a field as psychiatry, the ex-
perts are bound to differ."'I4
The Cavallo opinion offered an in-depth examination of the
"foundation requirements for the admissibility of new scientific
techniques" such as the psychiatric expert testimony there at is-
sue. 41 In the course of this examination, the court alluded to the
"general acceptance" standard articulated in Frye, and then
proceeded to consider methods of proving the general accept-
ance and, thereby, reliability of scientific evidence. Three such
trial court usually must rely on expert testimony"; and (2) "this approach relies on ad-
versary trial procedures to expose deficiencies." Id. at 194-95.
See also, Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970
U. ILL. L.R. 1, 22 (1970); Gianelli, supra note 112, at 1239, 1250; Graham, Evidence and
Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevancy and the Exclusion of Relevant Evidence: Admis-
sibility of Evidence of a Scientific Principle or Technique-Application of the Frye
Test, 19 CRIM L. BULL. 51 (1983); Imwinkelreid, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Pro-
ponents of Scientific Evidence, in IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33
(2d ed. 1981).
136. 88 N.J. 508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982).
137. Id. at 512, 443 A.2d at 1021-22.
138. Id. at 518, 443 A.2d at 1025.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 519, 443 A.2d at 1025 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 520, 443 A.2d at 1026.
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methods were cited as having gained recognition from the
courts: (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific and legal writings, and
(3) judicial opinions. " 2 The court then noted defendant's failure
to satisfy any one of these methods:
Here, defendants have offered no expert testimony as to
the general acceptance, by psychiatrists or any other
medical community, upon which [the proffered expert]
based his analysis. Reference to scientific writings . . . is
not shown in the present case. . . . Defendants have...
failed to persuade us that the proper evidence has been
accepted as reliable by other jurisdictions, or for other
purposes in the New Jersey legal system. "
Based on this, the Cavallo court concluded: "Defendants there-
fore have not met their burden under Rule 56 1 of showing that
[the proffered expert's] testimony is based on reasonable scien-
tific premises."1 5 When viewed against this judicial back-
ground," the reliability of psychiatric expertise in predicting
long-term future dangerousness that was relied on in Barefoot is
immediately suspect.
4 7
142. Id. at 521, 443 A.2d at 1026, citing Gianelli, supra note 112, at 1215.
143. Id. at 521-22, 526, 442 A.2d at 1026-27, 1029 (footnote omitted).
144. N.J. EVID. R. 56(2) closely parallels FED. R. EvID. 702 and 703. See generally, N.J.
RULES OF EVIDENCE (Anno. 1985), comments 5-9, at 382-97.
145. 88 N.J. at 526, 443 A.2d at 1029.
146. Several state courts have also rejected the use of psychiatric testimony as a reli-
able predictor of future behavior. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 631 P.2d
446, 174 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981) (use of psychopharmacologist's testimony concerning de-
fendant's future conduct in prison constitutes error requiring reversal of verdict at pen-
alty trial in a murder case); Matter of Kevin M., 113 Misc. 2d 896, 450 N.Y.S.2d 261
(Fain. Ct. 1982) ( in deciding whether a juvenile should be placed in a more restrictive
setting, court relied on juvenile's actions rather than predictions of dangerousness); Mat-
ter of Tanise B., 119 Misc. 2d 30, 462 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Faro. Ct. 1983) (in a suit regarding
termination of parental rights, mother is entitled to presence of counsel at court-ordered
psychiatric examination because of the unreliability and subjectivity of psychiatric testi-
mony); Moss v. State of Texas, 539 S.W.2d 936, 951 (Tex. Ct. Civ. Appeals 1976) (in a
civil commitment case, court stated that no expert "is sufficiently qualified by training or
experience in the prediction of human behavior that his bare opinion of 'potential dan-
ger' is sufficient to justify the court in depriving a person of his liberty").
147. It does not appear that Frye has ever been analyzed with regard to the specific
question of psychiatric predictivity of dangerousness, although it has been considered in
cases involving, e.g., the existence of a specific type of mental disorder, see State v.
Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) ("rape trauma syndrome"), or the requisite
mental state necessary to find a specific intent in a murder prosecution, see Hughes v.
Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1978). Marks merely cites Frye in a "see also"
19851
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Barefoot stands alone, it would seem, in recent case law in
its "unquestioned assumption of expert infallibility."'"" Only
reference while Hughes indulges in no systemic analysis of the issues in question. Cf.
United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring in
part in a separate opinion) ("it may be that the validity of [certain psychological] tests is
so doubtful that they should be excluded from evidence as a matter of law") id. n.85,
citing Frye; People v. Spigno, 156 Cal. App. 2d 279, 319 P.2d 458, 463-65 (D. Ct. App.
1957) (construing Frye to reject testimony of psychologist on defendant's "lustful in-
tent"). Cavallo, of course, recognized the distinction between "a prediction about the
likelihood of having committed certain criminal acts (and) amenability to cure for sick-
ness." State v. Cavallo 88 N.J. 508, 525, 443 A.2d 1020, 1028 (1978) (emphasis added).
For a recent survey of criticisms of the increased use of scientific evidence, finding a
"shockingly high level of error in forensic analysis," see Imwinkelried, The Standard for
Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28
VILL. L. REV. 554, 560 (1982-83). Although Imwinkelried ultimately concludes that the
"clear weight of the available hard data calls into question the assumption underlying
Frye, namely, that scientific testimony overwhelms the typical lay juror," id. at 570, he
notes that the question "implicates fundamental libertarian and democratic values," id.
at 571:
In a criminal case, when a defendant's liberty is at stake, how tolerant can
we be of evidence prone to error? In a democratic society, to what extent shall
we place our faith in lay jurors who have no expertise in the technical field to
which the testimony in the case relates?
Dr. Bernard Diamond, a "nationally known specialist" in forensic psychiatry, People v.
Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 328 n.19, 535 P.2d 352, 366 n.19, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 502 n.19
(1975), would, on the other hand, apply Frye "to all psychiatric predictions of danger-
ousness, not just those made during the penalty phase of a capital trial," Note, People v.
Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in
Capital Cases, 70 CALIF L. REV. 1069, 1087 (1982), counseling that all expert predictions
of dangerousness "should at least be viewed with extreme skepticism," id. at 1090.
For a recent exhaustive opinion construing FED. R. EvID. 702, rejecting the Frye test,
and relegating "acceptance of a scientific technique within the scientific community" to
the role of "one factor" to be considered in a determination of whether or not to admit
novel evidence, see United States v. Downing, 735 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
148. Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testi-
mony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. UL. REV. 11, 31
(1976).
For a thoughtful analysis of Barefoot expressing concern over the "danger that we
are approaching a situation in which we have an official court-determined science, a con-
cept grossly antithetical to the normal processes of science," see Levine, The Adversary
Process and Social Science in the Courts: Barefoot v. Estelle, 12 J. PSYCH. & L. 147, 170
(1984).
In cautioning care "in distinguishing the scientific from the interpretive frame of
reference when considering the values of expert testimony," id. at 172, Professor Levine
focuses on the work of Professors Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profes-
sionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427
(1980) which he sees as perhaps "reflecting the reality that the court's purpose is not
entirely that of making a probabilistic determination of past facts, but also includes cre-
ating an historical myth, a social consensus of what we say the past was in order to
justify actions in the future. The argument when viewed from this perspective is not
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two years before, the Supreme Court had noted in Smith:
Indeed, some in the psychiatric community are of the
view that clinical predictions as to whether a person
would or would not commit violent acts in the future are
"fundamentally of very low reliability" and that psychia-
trists possess no special qualifications for making such
forecasts.149
Yet the Barefoot court subsequently chose to ignore the vast ar-
ray of professional literature disclaiming the reliability of sub-
jective psychiatric predictions, via its reliance on an "almost
mechanistic invocation of the adversary process" and on a proce-
dure that "reflects neither the highest standards of reliability in
decision-making nor the exercise of discretion according to clear
and consistent criteria."' 51
Other problems with Barefoot are apparent. At least one
pre-Barefoot article has argued, presciently and articulately,
that, under the Principles of Medical Ethics Applicable to Psy-
chiatry, it is clearly unethical for a psychiatrist to testify as to a
defendant's dangerousness on the basis of either a hypothetical
or an examination without warning the defendant of the purpose
of the exam. 152 Under those principles, "it is unethical for a psy-
chiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he/she has con-
ducted an examination ... . While the majority in Barefoot
notes that, notwithstanding the views of the APA, "there are
about science, but about the interpretation of our culture." Id. at 173. For a more holistic
criticism of the current court's employment of "the illusory precision and the pretended
neutrality of a psuedo-scientific calculus for measuring claims and counterclaims," see
Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Psuedo-Scientific
Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 156 (1984).
149. On this point, the Court cited: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIA-
TION TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-20, 33 (1974);
STONE, supra note 40, at 27-36; and the APA Barefoot Brief, supra note 42, at 11-17.
150. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 135, at 702-19 (para. 702(03)): "Opinions which are
based in large measure on a subjective analysis may have less probative value because it
may be difficult to evaluate the skill of the expert in extrapolating a judgment from the
scientific data," relying on United States v. Williams, 538 F.2d 1194, 1199 n.9 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
151. The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 121 n.28, 127 (1983).
152. Ewing, 'Dr. Death' supra note 63, at 415. See also, Podgers, The Psychiatrist's
Role in Death Sentence Debated, 66 A.B.A.J. 1509 (1980).
153. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 7(3)(1981 rev. ed.)
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those doctors who are quite willing to testify at the sentencing
hearing [on future dangerousness in response to a hypotheti-
cal], it fails to note that such behavior is considered unethi-
cal when it is done without benefit of an examination. 155
Finally, the question of the scope of admissibility of evi-
dence where an expert did not personally examine the subject is
not as clear-cut as the Supreme Court would have us believe.
While the rule of law is usually stated that it is not generally
essential for an expert who testifies at a trial actually to examine
the subject matter of a lawsuit,156 most of the reported cases in-
volve civil litigation.157 In one criminal case on point involving
the admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony, a state
court held that the expert offered by the proponent must be the
one who conducted the hypnotic session "in order to aid the
court in evaluating the procedures followed.' 58 In light of the
Court's longstanding insistence that "the need for procedural
safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake,"' 59 it is
somewhat bizarre that, in Barefoot, the Court countenances tes-
timony generally appropriate in cases involving subject matter
such as defective hobby horses.'
At least one recent case has, so to speak, turned Barefoot on
154. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983).
155. For a blistering attack on Barefoot, see Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique
of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST.
UL. REV. 737, 760-66 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Geimer]. Professor Geimer character-
izes Barefoot as a "gross retreat" from the Court's commitment to reliability in death
sentencing, id. at 760, and a "bad faith abandonment" of established death penalty stan-
dards, id. at 764, reflecting "little desire on the part of the majority to be bothered with
facts at all," id. at 763.
156. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grosbard, 87 N.J. 512, 530, 435 A.2d 1150, 1159 (1981).
157. See, e.g., Savoia v. Woolworth, 88 N.J. Super. 153, 211 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1965)
(expert could testify as to dangers inherent in a mechanical hobby horse even though he
had only seen photos of the horse); Buckelew, 87 N.J. at 530, 435 A.2d at 1159 (although
witness had never examined patient in cut bladder/malpractice case, he had heard her
testify and could conclude her complaint was "commensurate" with the type of injury
usually caused by the operation in question).
158. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 545, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (1981).
159. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160. See Savoia v. Woolworth, 88 N.J. Super. 153, 211 A.2d 214 (App. Div. 1965).
At least one inter-disciplinary analysis of Barefoot has concluded, "if the enormous
problems raised by the use of hypothetically derived testimony in capital cases are to be
addressed, therefore, it will have to be by the psychiatric profession, not by the federal
courts." Showalter & Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital Sentencing: Risks and Respon-
sibilities in a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 159, 176 (1984).
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its heels. In State v. Davis, 6' the New Jersey Supreme Court
allowed a defendant at the penalty phase of a capital case162 to
introduce expert statistical testimony relating to empirical stud-
ies generally relevant to the defendant's potential for rehabilita-
tion where the defendant raises his character as a mitigating fac-
tor. 16 The court found such evidence, 6 -specifically "statistical
evidence of the rehabilitative potential of similarly situated de-
fendants"' 6"-could "assist the jury '  in its penalty phase
deliberations.
167
In ruling that such evidence came within the state's statu-
tory framework'18 the court found that "character" embraced
"those individual qualities that distinguish a particular per-
son,"' 69 including "his capacity to reform,' °7 0 and that empirical
studies "may under appropriate circumstances be sufficiently re-
lated to a defendant's rehabilitative potential to satisfy the stat-
utory threshold for relevancy.'' Specifically, "this kind of in--
formation, when presented by experts, . . . can assist lay
persons in the deliberative process to reach sound determina-
tions concerning an individual's character.'
72
161. 96 N.J. 611, 477 A.2d 308 (1984).
162. See generally, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (WEST 1982).
163. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (West 1982) (mitigating factors include
"any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the cir-
cumstances of the offense").
164. Defense counsel sought to proffer the expert testimony of Dr. Marvin E. Wolf-
gang, a sociologist, "eminent criminologist," and "expert in statistics," whose research
has focused on "the psychological and sociological determinants of violent crime." 96
N.J. 611, 615, 477 A.2d 308, 310 (1984). While Dr. Wolfgang never interviewed the de-
fendant, he relied on a "statistical profile" of the defendant's demographic "features"
which led him to conclude that, based on empirical studies, if the defendant were to
serve a mandatory minimum thirty year sentence (without parole eligibility), he "would
never again commit another serious crime of any kind." Id.
165. Id. at 617, 477 A.2d at 311.
166. Id.
167. The court cautioned that the admissibility of such evidence was "subject to ap-
propriate standards concerning its competency (such as its scientific reliability and the
qualifications of the expert witness)." Id.
168. While the court characterized its holding as "generally comport[ing] with consti-
tutional requirements" citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) and United
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1978), it chose to rest its determination solely on
state statutory grounds. See Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 617-18, 477 A.2d 308, 311-12 (1984).
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In buttressing this point, the court relied on Justice Black-
mun's dissent in Barefoot: "It has been observed that a layper-
son with access to relevant statistics can assess a defendant's re-
habilitative potential at least as well, and possibly better than,
those with psychiatric training in this area." ' The use of such
statistics is appropriate, given the "singular nature of the pen-
alty phase of a capital proceeding and the ineluctable conclusion
that doubts must be resolved in favor of admission when evi-
dence of a mitigating factor is offered by the defendant.' '1 4
The court found that a lowered threshold of mitigating evi-
dence at the sentencing phase was "consistent with [the] recog-
nition' 17 5 that "the imposition of death is. . .profoundly differ-
ent from all other penalties,,'71  and that "greater flexibility and
latitude' ' 7 7 may be accorded a fact finder in the use of such tes-
timony. Any shortcomings in such testimony, "when measured
by strict rules of evidential relevance and competence, ' 78
should be "properly relegated to the adversarial process [to per-
form] the task of 'separating the wheat from the chaff.' ,,179
173. Id. at 619, citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 922 (1983), (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Monahan, supra note 97, at 47-49; Steadman & Morrissey, The Statistical
Prediction of Violent Behavior, 5 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 271-73 (1981); Cocozza &
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Con-
vincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1101 (1976); American Psychiatric Ass'n
Task Force Report, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 28 (1974). The latter
four sources are all also cited by Justice Blackmun in his Barefoot dissent. See 463 U.S.
880, 921 n.2 (1983).
174. Davis, 96 N.J. at 620, 477 A.2d at 312.
175. Id. at 622, 477 A.2d at 313.
176. Id., quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
177. Id., 477 A.2d at 314.
178. Id. at 623, 477 A.2d at 313.
179. Id., (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 486 U.S. 880 (1983)). The court noted, however,
that it was not crafting a per se rule of admissibility:
However, relaxed standards for admissibility are not to be equated with au-
tomatic admissibility. Judicial tolerance is not judicial license. For example, in
this case the court may, upon a persuasive showing, consider the report, or any
of its component parts, incomplete and therefore unhelpful. Arguably, the report
could, upon countervailing proofs presented by the prosecutor through cross-ex-
amination or rebuttal evidence, be considered untrustworthy because of its fail-
ure to consider the educational background, employment history, familial status,
criminal record, or some other important demographic factor relating to the po-
tential for rehabilitation. It might also be considered flawed because of its use of,
or its undifferentiated emphasis upon, statistical data based upon race, gender,
or other suspect characteristic. The court must retain discretion to exclude the
evidence, in whole or in part, if its probative value is subtantially outweighed by
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Davis appears to be the only case to have so construed
Barefoot. By articulating its reliance on state statute,18 the New
Jersey Court could selectively rely on Justice Blackmun's dissent
on psychiatric predictive expertise (to support the admissibility
of non-medical, statistical evidence) and on the majority's opin-
ion on the jury's ability to make careful determinations as to
expert testimony. By doing so, it breathes new meaning into the
"death is different" language of pre-Barefoot cases, 181 and per-
haps, suggests to state courts in jurisdictions with similar char-
acter-mitigation evidence statutes a creative way to deal with
some of the problems posed by Barefoot.
1 82
II. AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO EXPERT ASSISTANCE
The average man on the street no doubt believes that the
present state of the criminal justice system affords indigent
criminal defendants the same privileges and protections as their
wealthy counterparts. The truth, however, is that where a de-
fendant must rely on the state to pay for his constitutional
rights, he sometimes walks a precarious route to "justice,"
fraught with artificial barriers and confused by unsettled case
law. Nowhere is this problem more capricious than in the provi-
sion of expert services to indigents at government expense.
83
While the case law has variously held that indigent defend-
ants were entitled to such services on a variety of constitutional
its unfounded or speculative character and the risk of confusion of the essential
issues.
Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 623-24, 477 A.2d 308, 314 (1984) (footnote omitted).
180. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
181. The "irony" of the Davis result is noted in Geimer, supra note 155, at 764 n.124.
182. Cf. United States v. Torniero, 725 F.2d 725, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting
"wheat from the chaff" rationale in case unsuccessfully seeking to raise "compulsive
gambling disorder" as relevant to insanity defense plea):
The insanity defense has never been free from controversy, criticism, and
revision. No rule designed to embody societal values will ever be sacrosanct. As
our understanding of the intricacies of the fathomless human mind continues to
evolve, legal rules must respond to changed conceptions of the nature of moral
culpability, and to advances in the science of mental illness. The fundamental
question will always be an inquiry into how best to embody society's sense of
what conduct is appropriate for punishment by criminal sanctions.
Id. at 724-35.
183. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional
and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 CINN. L. REv. 574 (1982).
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theories,18 prior to this term there had been no unequivocal Su-
preme Court holding that a defendant had such a right. In fact,
a 1953 case, United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi,185 which had
rejected the argument that there was such a right, appeared to
raise a near-insurmountable obstacle to the proposition that the
Constitution requires appointment of an expert witness at state
expense. 86
Yet, at least seven overlapping but distinct rationales for
providing necessary defense services to indigents have been ar-
ticulated: "(1) establishment of the defendant's innocence; (2)
equality of access to justice as between the poor and the rich; (3)
equality of access to justice as between the indigent defendant
and the prosecutor; (4) access to that which is fundamental for a
'fair trial'; (5) access to that which assures an 'adequate defense';
(6) access to that which 'assists counsel,' and, (7) access to that
which assures an 'effective defense.' ",187 Beyond this, the Baldi
doctrine had been progressively eroded by three decades of de-
velopment of constitutional doctrine which applied the equal
protection clause 188 and the due process clause' 89 to claims by
indigent defendants in contexts which presuppose a criminal
justice system in which "partisan advocacy on both sides of a
case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free."' 90
184. See, e.g., Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980) (due process and
equal protection require appointment of medical expert); People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d
228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966) (right to compulsory process of witnesses requires appoint-
ment of handwriting expert); State v. Sahlie, 90 S.D. 682, 245 N.W.2d 476 (1976) (right
to counsel includes right to appointment of fingerprint experts where defendant's re-
quest is reasonable, timely, and financially necessary). For an analysis suggesting equal
protection prong of Williams was "superfluous," see Note, Constitutional Law-Equal
Protection-Refusal to Provide Expert Witnessess for Indigent Defendant Denies
Equal Protection-Williams v. Martin, 59 WAsH.U.L.Q. 317, 328 (1981) ("court need not
have reached equal protection question . . . [but instead] could have followed other
courts by relying on the established due process ground"). Id. at 328.
185. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
186. Decker, supra note 183, at 576; see, e.g., Nelson v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 797, 151
N.W.2d 694 (1967) (citing Baldi).
187. Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A
Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647, 652 (1973).
188. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to trial transcript).
189. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial).
190. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). See also, e.g., Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967)
(right to transcript of preliminary hearing); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
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These doctrinal developments have been paralleled vari-
ously by scholarly analyses, 9" professional standard-setting, 192
and legislative testimony 93 urging that a constitutional right to
expert assistance for indigent defendants be provided in appro-
priate cases.' 94 Baldi appeared to be more and more of an
anachronism,' 95 especially in the context of the need of an ex-
pert to proffer an insanity defense. '96
The use of partisan experts in insanity defense trials has
(right to effective counsel); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right for prisoners to
have available adequate law libraries or adequate legal assistance in habeas corpus
proceedings).
191. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 183; Margolin & Wagner, supra note 187; Note,
The Indigent's Right to An Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance
in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in Addition
to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REV. 1054 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Right to Aid].
192. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT OF STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.5 (1968) (would require government to "provide
for investigatory, expert and other services necessary to an adequate defense").
193. See, e.g., remarks of former ABA President Sylvester C. Smith, Jr. in support of
federal law (now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982)) providing for the appointment
and payment of experts "necessary to an adequate defense":. Even though [counsel] were zealous in performing their legal duties, without
investigative services, when the assigned lawyer is met with all the prepared
forces of the Government prosecution, they cannot meet it adequately.
Criminal Justice Act; Hearings on HR 1027, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm.
No. 5, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 126 (1963), (quoted in Petitioner's Brief at 23, Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Ake Petitioner's Brief].
194. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087
(1985), see infra text accompanying notes 250-91, eight of the Courts of Appeals and at
least eighteen states had made such a constitutional finding, see Ake Petitioner's Brief
supra note 193, at 23-25 and nn.14-15, while nineteen states had enacted statutes to
provide for the compensation of defense experts, id., at 25, n.17.
195. See, e.g,. Decker, supra note 183, at 576 ("the holding and underlying rationale
of Baldi has been eroded by certain empirical data and effectively has been distinguished
out of existence by subsequent case law and the development of procedural due
process").
196. See, e.g., Note, Right to Aid, supra note 191, at 1075 (of all experts, "the need
for psychiatrists may be most pressing because of [the] complexity of the insanity issue
and the frequency with which it arises"). But see on the issue of frequency, Defense
Under Siege, supra note 16, at 401 (New Jersey statistics reveal insanity plea raised in
less than one sixth of one percent of all cases, and successful in fewer than one third of
those). Other studies are in accord. See, e.g., Pasewark & Pantle, Insanity Plea: Legisla-
tors' View, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 222, 222-23 (1979); Lauter, Why Insanity Defense is
Breaking Down, NAT'L L.J., May 3, 1982, at 1, 11. It should also be noted that in Baldi,
neutral psychiatrists did testify. See 344 U.S. at 568; see also United States ex rel Smith
v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 547 (3d Cir. 1951). This aspect of Baldi is discussed in Decker,
supra note 183, at 580-81.
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been a "well established" practice for 300 years. 197 Expert wit-
nesses were critical to the final outcome in such seminal insanity
cases as Hadfield's Case,'9" Regina v. Oxford,99  and
M'Naghten's Case.20 Isaac Ray, an authority in the field, noted
the "utmost importance" of expert testimony at an insanity
trial, 0 ' finding it essential that such testimony be "founded on
extraordinary knowledge and skill relative to the particular dis-
ease, insanity.
'202
Such testimony serves at least three purposes:
[F]irst, it supplies the court with facts concerning the of-
fender's illness; second, it presents informed opinion con-
cerning the nature of that illness; and third, it furnishes a
basis for deciding whether the illness made the patient
legally insane at the time of the crime under that juris-
197. Medical experts have been called to testify in trials in England since the four-
teenth century. M. GUTTMACHER, THE MIND OF THE MURDERER 109 (1960); citing Hand,
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REV.
40 (1901) ("in 1345, [the] court summoned surgeons to state whether or not a wound was
a fresh one" in an appeal of a mayhem conviction). After surveying the earlier reported
cases (beginning with Alsop v. Bowtrell, Cro. Jac. 541 (1619)), Guttmacher concludes
that, "by the last quarter of the seventeenth century the practice of employing partisan
experts had become well established," id. at 112, noting that in the manslaughter trial of
the Earl of Pembroke in the House of Lords, 6 Howell St. Tr. 847 (1678), "physicians
were called by both sides to testify as to the cause of death," id. at 112-13.
See also Simon, The Defense of Insanity, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 183, 193 (1983)
("By the middle of the seventeenth century ... the experts were called as witnesses by
the parties involved in the dispute"). For an historical overview, see Brief of Amicus for
the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate at 8-10, Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct.
1087 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Ake NJDPA Brief].
198. 27 Howell's St. Tr. 1281, 1320, 1334-36 (K.B. 1800).
199. 9 Car. & P. 525, 541 (N.P. 1840).
200. 10 Cl. & F. 200, 201, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). The M'Naghten trial is de-
scribed in detail in Quen, An Historical View of the M'Naghten Trial, in 1 R. RIEBER
AND H. VETTER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93-94 (1978); see
also R. MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL
MCNAGHTEN (1981).
201. I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (1838), § 27 at
48 (Overholser ed. 1962).
202. Id., § 28 at 50; see generally Ake NJDPA Brief, supra note 197, at 12-16. For
impact of Ray's writings on the M'Naghten trial, see Quen, Isaac Ray and Mental Hy-
giene in America, 291 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 83, 84 (1977); Quen, An Historical View of
the M'Naghten Trial, 42 BULL. HIST. MED. 43 (1968); Block, The Semantics of Insanity,
36 OKLA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1983); Weiner, Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Sane
Approach, 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1980); Diamond, Isaac Ray and the Trial of
Daniel M'Naghten, 112 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 651, 652-54 (1956).
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diction's standards of insanity.
20 3
203. Halleck, The Role of the Psychiatrist in the Criminal Justice System, PSYCHIA-
TRY 1982 ANN. REV. 386, 391 (1982), quoted in Ake NJDPA Brief, supra note 196, at 17.
See generally Brief of Amicus for the American Psychiatric Association at 11-12, Ake v.
Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Ake APA Brief] (emphasis added
in the original):
Although largely meaningless to a lay person, the data generated in a psy-
chiatric evaluation enables the psychiatrist to formulate an opinion on the ques-
tion of a defendant's mental state at the time of the crime. The psychiatrist thus
transforms clinical data into evidence that is accessible to the fact-finder. Simi-
larly, the psychiatrist's interpretative skills are brought to bear on any "direct"
evidence that may be available in a particular case, such as contemporaneous
writings of the defendant or lay witnesses' observations of unusual behavior.
Even nonclinical data of this type must be subject to the careful interpretation
of a diagnostician.
Assuming a defendant has a valid insanity defense, it is hard to imagine
how, absent the assistance of a psychiatrist both before and during trial, he will
be able to persuade the jury of its merits. Because of the essentially retrospec-
tive nature of the sanity inquiry, it does the defendant little good to show only
that he was seriously mentally ill at some point other than the time of the crime
Psychiatric testimony is also necessary to provide the jury with an explana-
tion for conduct that might otherwise appear incomprehensible. Lay jurors may
be able to recognize that a defendant's actions are aberrant or bizarre. Only on
the basis of clinical diagnosis, however, can they seriously entertain the possibil-
ity that the defendant is not responsible for these actions. Psychiatric testimony
is necessary to explain effects of a defendant's mental disorder on his cognition
or control-relevant factors under the sanity tests of most jurisdictions. Psychi-
atric testimony is also necessary to give the jury a logical and coherent account
of how a particular mental illness can affect the criminal behavior with which
the defendant is charged. This account is a crucial link in the defense.
See also, Ake Petitioner Brief, supra note 193, at 30-31:
Like an attorney, an expert psychiatrist or psychologist can provide indis-
pensable assistance both before and during trial. Indeed, as with an attorney,
pre-trial assistance may often be the more crucial. An expert is necessary not
only to conduct an examination of the defendant, but to make the initial deter-
mination of what tests and examinations need to be conducted. Elements of a
patient's medical or personal history that may seem insignificant to a lawyer
may have great meaning to a psychiatrist or psychologist; without an expert's
help, a lawyer may not even know what questions to ask. See Goldstein & Fine,
The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 1061, 1066 (1962). For similar reasons, the expert can enable the defense
attorney better to anticipate the testimony of the prosecution experts, so as to
prepare for cross-examination and rebuttal. F. BAIEY & H. ROTHBLATT, INVESTI-
GATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES 467 (1970).
And at trial, an expert can convey and explain his findings to the judge and
jury in a manner that lay witnesses just cannot match. "All juries will be im-
pressed by lucid explanations of the forces, drives and compulsions which affect
the controls of an abnormal personality which has become separated from real-
ity." Blocket v. United States, 228 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J.,
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As a result, a defendant's access to independent medical evi-
dence has become "inextricably intertwined with his very ability
to obtain a fundamentally fair trial.
'20 4
The "table stakes," are, of course, even higher because of
the nature of psychiatric expertise itself. Such expertise de-
mands rigorous "adversarial testing" 0 5-in part, because of sub-
tleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis "which render cer-
tainties virtually meaningless, ' 2 °  and, in part, because the
Supreme Court has endorsed the validity of such expert testi-
mony on future dangerousness questions in capital cases, relying
on the adversary system to expose any deficiencies in such testi-
mony.207 Unfortunately counsel historically has been "grossly in-
adequate '20 8 in the ability to elicit and evaluate such testimony
effectively.
"A defense attorney, in a criminal trial involving the in-
sanity defense, who is realistically expected to fulfill his proper
role of adducing probative evidence in support of his client's
concurring). But lucid explanations of such forces, drives and compulsions can-
not be presented by lay witnesses who do not themselves have an educated un-
derstanding of such phenomena. In short, the defendant whose defense is in-
sanity simply "cannot expect to succeed unless he can present an expert
witness." Goldstein & Fine, supra, at 1063. As Justice Brennan once wrote, an
attorney appointed to defend such a case without access to expert assistance can
often do little but "throw his hands up in despair." Brennan, Law and Psychia-
try Must Join in Defending Mentally III Criminals, 49 A.B.A.J. 239, 242 (1963).
204. Ake NJDPA Brief, supra note 197, at 18.
205. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
206. Addington v. Texas, 411 U.S. 418, 430 (1979); see also Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 12
(symptoms of insanity "elusive and often deceptive"). See generally Diamond & Loui-
sell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63
MICH. L. REV. 1335 (1965).
207. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-99 (1983).
208. Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the
Commitment Process, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 166 (1982).
[Mlany lawyers possess scant knowledge about psychiatric decision-making,
diagnosis, and evaluation tools. This shortcoming can seriously impede their
cross-examination of expert witnesses. Once psychiatric testimony is elicited few
lawyers have the special skills to evaluate such testimony.
Id. See generally Perlin, Representing Individuals in the Commitment and Guardian-
ship Process, in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 497 (Friedman ed.
1979); Van Ness & Perlin, Mental Health Advocacy: The New Jersey Experience, in
MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS' RIGHTS 62 (Kopolow &
Bloom eds. 1977); Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the Criminal Commitment Pro-
cess, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 385 (1972). Historical surveys are cited in Perlin & Sadoff,
supra, at 161 n.6, 164 nn.28-32.
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claim and in challenging the State's evidence, must acquire the
requisite psychiatric expertise to accomplish that task. ' 20 9 And,
while probative and rigorous cross-examination of an opposing
psychiatrist may partially fulfill this role,2 10 "calling to the stand
a psychiatrist who disagrees with the opposing psychiatrist is an
even better way of forcing judges and juries to use their common
sense."'211 For advocacy to be "effective,"2"2 independent psychi-
atric expertise in aid of the presentation of an insanity defense
would appear to be a "necessit[y], not [a] luxur[y]"; 1 3 the ab-
sence of an expert witness truly "goes to the very trustworthi-
ness of the criminal justice process.1
21 4
While this summary reflects near total scientific and legal
accord,215 it could in no way be seen as a persuasive argument in
support of the proposition that the Supreme Court would even-
tually endorse it.21 This appears to be so especially in light of
the Court's basic silence on the point since Baldi217 was decided
over three decades ago. Thus, when the Court granted certiorari
in Ake v. Oklahoma21 8 to a "5000 Docket" case219 raising this
209. Ake NJDPA Brief, supra note 197, at 43. See generally Poythress, Psychiatric
Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise]
(blame for suspect expert must be jointly borne by lawyer and witness); Poythress,
Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCH. & L. 201, 204 (1977).
210. See generally Perlin & Sadoff, Ethical Isssues in the Representation of Individ-
uals in the Commitment Process, supra note 208, at 166; Poythress, Psychiatric Exper-
tise in Civil Commitment: Training to Cope with Expert Testimony, supra note 209, at
15; Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, supra note 209, at
214; ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed. 1981).
211. Ennise & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 746 (1974).
212. M Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970).
213. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
214. United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713, 717 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984 (1973).
215. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (consensus reflects "funda-
mental nature" of rights); see also, eg., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-97 (1982).
216. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
217. The issue was, in fact, briefed over twenty years ago in Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S.
586 (1963), but the Court deferred a constitutional evaluation at that time. For a discus-
sion of Bush in this context, see Note, Right to Aid, supra note 191, at 1056, 1075.
218. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. 1091 (1984).
219. In forma pauperis proceedings in the Supreme Court are governed by 28 U.S.C.
1915 (1983) and U.S. SuP. CT. R. 46. Docketing of such cases begins each term with the
number "5001," hence, these are known as the "5000 docket" cases. For an explanation,
see STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 1.13 (5th ed. 1978).
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precise issue 220 so soon after its decisions in Barefoot and Jones
v. United States,22 ' it was not clear at all that Baldi would sub-
sequently be put to rest.
Glenn Burton Ake was charged in the Oklahoma state
courts with two counts of murder and two of shooting with in-
tent to kill.2 22 Because of his behavior at his arraignment, 223 the
trial judge sua sponte ordered a psychiatric examination to ad-
vise him "whether the Defendant may need an extended period
of mental observation. 2 24 The report characterized defendant as
"at times . . . frankly delusional. . . . He claims to be the
'sword of vengeance' of the Lord and that he will sit at the left
hand of God in heaven. 2 25 As a result of this examination, the
examining psychiatrist diagnosed defendant as a "probable
paranoid schizophrenic" and recommended a prolonged psychi-
atric evaluation to determine defendant's competency to stand
trial.226
220. Three questions were actually presented in Ake:
1. When an indigent defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is seriously
in issue, can a State constitutionally refuse to provide any opportunity whatso-
ever for him to obtain the psychiatric assistance and examination necessary to
prepare and establish his insanity defense?
2. When a State seeks in a capital case to prove the aggravating circumstance
of future dangerousness through psychiatric testimony, can it constitutionally
refuse to provide an indigent defendant with psychiatric assistance to rebut that
testimony and to develop and present mitigating evidence?
3. Can a State constitutionally put a defendant on trial, without making an
inquiry into his competency, when he is involuntarily receiving psychoactive
medication that renders him unable to participate in his defense and prejudices
his appearance before the jury?
Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 193, at i.
In light of its eventual disposition of the case, see infra text accompanying note 251,
the Court declined to address the third question. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092 n.2.
221. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). For analysis of Jones, see sources
cited infra at notes 487 & 505.
222. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
223. The arraigning judge characterized his behavior as "bizarre." Ake Petitioner's
Brief, supra note 193, at 2, quoting J.A. 2.
224. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1090.
225. Id. at 1090-91.
226. Id. at 1091. While defendant's trial was underway, an Oklahoma statute became
effective authorizing the trial court to "initiate a competency determination on its own
motion . . . if the court has a doubt as to the competency of the [defendant]." OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 1175.2 (1980). Under the Constitution, a person who cannot understand
and participate intelligently in the proceedings against him may not be put to trial. See
Drope v. Missouri, 320 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
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Defendant was subsequently transferred to a state hospital
for a competency evaluation, as a result of which the hospi-
tal's chief forensic psychiatrist found him not competent to
stand trial.228 After a hearing,229 the court found defendant in-
competent, and ordered him committed to the state hospital.
23 0
Within six weeks, the state hospital psychiatrist told the court
that defendant had regained his competency, noting that he was
being maintained on 200 milligram doses of Thorazine three
times daily.2 s1  Criminal proceedings were immediately
resumed. 2
Defendant's attorney then notified the court that the de-
fendant would raise an insanity defense, and asked the court to
arrange either to have a psychiatrist examine defendant with re-
spect to his mental condition at the time of the offense, or to
provide funds to allow the defendant to arrange for one in light
of defendant's indigency. 233 The judge rejected this request in
light of what he characterized as an "almost cripplingly restric-
tive" state law2 4 and on the authority of Baldi, holding that
227. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
228. Id.
229. At the competency hearing, a psychiatrist who had consulted with the state hos-
pital's chief forensic psychiatrist, see Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 193, at 2-3,
testified:
[Ake] is a psychotic . . . his psychiatric diagnosis was that of paranoid
schizophrenia-chronic, with exacerbation, that is with current upset, and that
in addition to the psychiatric diagnosis, that he is dangerous.
Because of the severity of his mental illness and because of the intensities of
his rage, his poor control, his delusions, he requires a maximum security facility
within-I believe-the State Psychiatric Hospital system.
Id. at 3. The psychiatrist was never asked a question about defendant's mental condition
of the time of the offense. Id. at 3-4.
230. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
231. Id. Thorazine is the first of the major psychotropic drugs to be developed and
has been in wide use as a treatment for mental illness since the 1950's, see Winick,
Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J.
769, 779-80. It is a powerful sedative, see, e.g., Chesney v. Adams, 377 F.Supp. 998, 889
(D. Conn. 1974); DETRE & JARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 536 (1971), whose
properties have been noted in the past by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 358 n.16, 360-61
(1983); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), Transcript of Oral Argument, April
24, 1978, at 29.
232. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
233. Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 193, at 5, quoting J.A. 20.
234. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
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there was "no constitutional duty to provide private psychiatric
examination to indigent defendants.
2 3 5
At the trial, defendant's sole defense was insanity.23 6 De-
fendant called to the stand each of the psychiatrists who had
examined defendant while he was at the state hospital, but none
was able to testify as to his mental state at the time of the of-
fense because none had so examined him as to insanity.2 7 There
was thus, "no expert testimony for either side on Ake's sanity
at the time of the offense."238 The jury rejected defendant's in-
sanity defense3 9 and found him guilty on all counts. 40
235. Id.
236. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091.
237. Id. The testimony of Dr. Enos is typical:
Q. Then your examinations, or your conclusions are not whether he knew right
from wrong?
A. No.
Q. And, certainly wouldn't relate to the months of October-
A. Not at all.
Q. -or November 1979, as to whether he knew right from wrong?
A. That's correct.
Q. Is there any place in any report you have ever seen, or anything you have had
the benefit to review, that has said "this defendant was legally insane in Octo-
ber or November of 1979?"
A. No, Sir.
Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether-
A. No, sir.
Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 193, at 7, quoting J.A. 46.
238. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091 (emphasis in original).
239. Defendant did not testify. As his trial counsel explained:
[D]ue to the uncooperative nature of the defendant, and the lack of commu-
nication . . . defense counsel at this time is unable to put the defendant on the
witness stand, or to determine whether or not he in fact wants to execute [sic]
his Constitutional right to testify in his behalf ... . We cannot get a yes or no if
he wants to take the stand, so we rest.
Ake Petitioner's Brief, supra note 193, at 9, quoting J.A. 54-55.
Earlier in the trial, in an in-chambers statement, defense counsel had characterized
defendant as "goofier than hell":
Mr. Brewer: We waive presence of our-he ain't going to talk to us any-
way. He doesn't know what is going on. He is goofier than
hell. We don't need him, and he can't assist us. We have al-
ready told the court that he doesn't possess the ability to aid
and assist in a jury trial. Has he ever talked to you, Mr.
Strubhar?
Mr. Strubhar: No.
Mr. Brewer: He has never talked to me. Never said hello.
Id. at 10, quoting J.A. 27. Brewer and Strubhar were defendant's two trial counsel.
240. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092.
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At the sentencing proceeding, no new evidence was
presented.2 41 In summation, the prosecution relied on previ-
ously-adduced psychiatric testimony to establish that defendant
was mentally ill and dangerous, and that there was a "high
probability that [Ake] would again commit criminal acts of vio-
lence. ' 24 2 Defendant had no expert witness to rebut this testi-
mony or introduce mitigating evidence on the question of pun-
ishment.4M The jury sentenced defendant to death on the
murder charges and to 500 years imprisonment on each of the
two lesser offenses.24
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals rejected defend-
ant's constitutional argument that he was entitled to a court-
appointed psychiatrist "as incident to his constitutional rights to
effective assistance of counsel and availability of compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses. 2 45 Notwithstanding "the unique
nature of capital cases," the appellate court affirmed, holding
that Oklahoma had no responsibility to provide such services to
indigents charged with capital offenses.24 Although the court
noted that defendant "remained mute throughout his trial...
refus[ing] to converse with his attorneys, . . . star[ing] straight
ahead during both stages of the proceedings, '24 7 it speculated
that it was possible that "the defense of insanity interposed by
the appellant fostered such behavior on his part. '248 The Su-





245. Ake v. State, 633 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 7 n.4.
Allegations of "faking" have been a standard institutional response to patients' com-
plaints about the severe side effects of psychotropic medications. See, e.g., Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (D.N.J. 1978), suppl, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979),
modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983). This is hardly a new problem. In 1838, Dr. Isaac Ray, the father
of American forensic psychiatry, noted that:
[T]he supposed insurmountable difficulty of distinguishing between feigned
and real insanity has conduced, probably more than all other causes together, to
bind the legal profession to the most rigid construction and application of the
common law relative to this disease, and is always put forward in objection to
the more human doctrines.
RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 243 (1838). See also, De-
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preme Court then granted certiorari.2 "4
The Court reversed, 50 holding that "when a defendant has
made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the
offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitu-
tion requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assis-
tance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford
one."
251
After disposing of a jurisdictional issue, 202 the Court ob-
served that it had "long recognized that when a State brings its
judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a
fair opportunity to present his defense." s5 This principle,
grounded in the due process clause's guarantee of "fundamental
fairness,"2 5 4 derives from the belief "that justice cannot be equal
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial pro-
tense Under Siege, supra note 16, at 404.
The overwhelming weight of scientific evidence is in accord: Schizophrenic
patients with post-psychotic depression have been described as "wooden" in ap-
pearance, motorally "inactive or retarded," lacking initiative to perform routine
tasks, experiencing overwhelming fatigue and neurasthenic symptoms, "hyper-
somnic" and "emotionally withdrawn." Nearly all reports comment on the pa-
tient's disinclination to speak. All of these symptoms, however, can be manifes-
tations of antipsychotic drug-induced akinesia.
Van Putten & May, Akinetic Depression in Schizophrenia, 35 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 1101
(1978) (emphasis in original). See also, Hartley & Couper-Smartt, Paradoxical Effects in
Sleep and Performance of Two Doses of Chlorpromazine, 58 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 201
(1978); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 945 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976), 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded 458 U.S. 1101 (1982), on remand 691 F.2d 634 (3d Cir. 1982). See
generally, Ake NJDPA Brief, supra note 196, at 54-55 nn.43-44.
249. Ake, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984).
250. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the majority opinion in which six other justices
joined; Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Justice
Rehnquist dissented.
251. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092.
252. Oklahoma had successfully argued below that, because defendant had not re-
peated his request in his motion for a new trial, that claim was waived. See Ake, 663
P.2d at 6, citing Hawkins v. State, 569 P.2d 490 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1977). It then
argued to the Supreme Court that the holding below relied on an "independent and
adequate state ground" and should thus not be reviewed. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1092. This
argument was rejected because the federal constitutional error made below was a "funda-
mental" one, id.; in such circumstances, "the state law prong of the court's holding is not
independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded," id. at 1093, citing Heb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).
253. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1093.
254. Id.
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ceeding in which his liberty is at stake."25 5
"Meaningful access to justice" is the theme of the relevant
cases, the Court found,2 5 6 noting that "mere access to the court-
house door does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the
adversary process."25 7 A criminal trial is "fundamentally unfair
if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant without
making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral
to the building of an effective defense."
2 5 8
In determining whether access to a psychiatrist is one of the
"basic tools of an adequate defense," 59 the Court set out three
relevant factors:
The first is the private interest that will be affected by
the action of the State. The second is the governmental
interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be pro-
vided. The third is the probable value of the additional
or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought and
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected inter-
est if those safeguards are not provided. . . .260
It quickly disposed of the first prong, characterizing the pri-
vate interest in accuracy of a criminal proceeding as "almost
uniquely compelling. '"26 It just as summarily rejected the argu-
ment that a reversal would "result in a staggering burden to the
state, ' 262 noting that at least forty states and-the federal govern-
ment already made such services available. 6 It also found it
"difficult to identify any interest of the state, other than in its
255. Id. The Court reviewed its line of decisions from Griffin through Gideon citing
also Strickland, McMann and Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985), for the proposition
that any assistance of counsel be effective. Id., See Part III, infra.
256. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
257. Id.
258. Id. While such a defendant does not have a right to all the assistance that a
wealthier defendant might be able to purchase, he is nonetheless entitled to "an ade-
quate opportunity to present [his] claims fairly within the adversary system." Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
259. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
260. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094. On this point the Court cited Little v. Streater, 452 U.S.
1 (1981) (indigent's right to blood grouping tests in paternity action), and Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094-95, and id. nn.4-6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1983).
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economy, that weighs against recognition of this right."'264 Fi-
nally it considered the "pivotal role" psychiatry has come to
play in criminal proceedings, 265 reflecting the "reality . . .that
when the State has made the defendant's mental condition rele-
vant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might
suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the
defendant's ability to marshal his defense.
2 66
Adopting sub silentio the arguments of petitioner and
amici, the Court set out what it perceived as the role of the psy-
chiatrist in such cases:
[P]sychiatrists gather facts, both through professional ex-
amination, interviews, and elsewhere, that they will share
with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gath-
ered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the de-
fendant's mental condition, and about the effects of any
disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how
the defendant's mental condition might have affected his
behavior at the time in question. They know the proba-
tive questions to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists
and how to interpret their answers. Unlike lay witnesses,
who can merely describe symptoms they believe might be
relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychiatrists
can identify the "elusive and often deceptive" symptoms
of insanity, and tell the jury why their observations are
relevant. Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules,
psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into lan-
guage that will assist the trier of fact, and therefore offer
evidence in a form that has meaning for the task at hand.
Through this process of investigation, interpretation and
testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay jurors, who gen-
erally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a
sensible and educated determination about the medical
condition of the defendant at the time of the offense.267
264. Id. at 1095. "Unlike a private litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an
interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that
advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained." Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Ake, 105 S. Ct. 1095-96 (citation omitted).
[Vol. III
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Because psychiatry is not an exact science, however, and be-
cause of frequent psychiatric disagreement on the classification
and diagnosis of mental illness and the likelihood of future dan-
gerousness, it is often necessary for juries to resolve the differ-
ences in opinion.2 8 On such a determination, "the testimony of
psychiatrists can be crucial and 'a virtual necessity if an insanity
plea is to have any chance of success.' ",211 This finding led the
Court "inexorably" to conclude that:
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a
professional examination on issues relevant to the de-
fense, to help determine whether the insanity defense is
viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing
the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses,
the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is ex-
tremely high. With such assistance, the defendant is
fairly able to present at least enough information to the
jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit it to make a
sensible determination.
268. Id. at 1096. Although the Court characterized juries as "the primary fact find-
ers" on the issue of insanity, id., this may not be so, in the light of the findings that over
80% of all insanity defense cases result in stipulations as to insanity. See, e.g.,
Steadman, Insanity Acquittals in New York State, 1965-1978, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
321, 322 (1980); Insanity Defense in Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. 261 (1982)
(testimony of N.J. Public Advocate Joseph H. Rodriguez). See e.g., Sadoff, The Effect of
the Hinckley Trial on the Insanity Defense, DIRECTIONS IN PSYCIATRY, Lesson 29, at 3
(1983) (substantial psychiatric agreement as to insanity in "by far the majority of
cases").
One recent study has revealed near-unanimity in insanity determinations among
court appointed, non-adversarial psychiatric examiners. See Fukunaga, Pasewark, Haw-
kins & Gudeman, Insanity Plea: Interexaminer Agreement and Concordance of Psychi-
atric Opinion and Court Verdict, 5 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 325, 326 (1981) (92% agreement,
characterized as an "explicitly high" "magnitude of congruence").
269. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096, quoting, in part, Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial
Psychiatric Expert-Some Comments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the De-
cline of the Age of Therapy, 2 L. & PSYCHOL. REV., 99, 113-14 (1976).
The Court stressed that psychiatrists "enable the [members of the] jury to make its
most accurate determination of the truth on the issue before them," and, "for this rea-
son, the States and wealthy individuals, rely on psychiatrists as examiners, consultants
and witnesses." Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096. It concluded on this point: "In so saying, we
neither approve nor disapprove the widespread reliance on psychiatrists but instead rec-
ognize the unfairness of a contrary holding in light of the evolving practice." Id.
270. Id. As a recent student note has aptly pointed out, "[p]sychiatric opinions are
neither value-neutral nor unbiased. Instead, a psychiatrist may become an advocate for a
party in subtle ways, a fact which makes it almost impossible to defend effectively
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As the risk of error from denial of such assistance is highest
"when the defendant's mental condition is seriously in ques-
tion, '2 71 the defendant would thus qualify for such assistance
when he is able to make an "ex parte threshold showing ...
that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his de-
fense."27 The Court thus held that when a defendant is able to
demonstrate that his sanity was such a "significant factor," the
state must "assure the defendant access to a competent psychia-
trist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
the evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense.
'273
On the question of the defendant's right to a psychiatrist to
rebut the State's evidence of his future dangerousness, the Court
reasoned that a similar conclusion was compelled. Noting that
Barefoot had approved the practice of allowing jurors to hear
against allegations by mental health experts without an expert of one's own." Note, Peo-
ple v. Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness
in Capital Cases, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1080 (1982), citing inter alia, 1 J. ZISKIN, COPING
WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY, 38 (3d ed. 1981); Diamond, The Psy-
chiatrist as an Advocate, J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1973); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals,
and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 625 (1978);
Pollack, Psychiatric Consultation for the Courts, in MEDICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC TESTI-
MONY IN CRIMINAL CASES 177, 187-88 (1968).
Judge Bazelon has similarly noted that "psychiatry is not a value-free discipline,"
referring to the "institutional pressure and personal biases that cause psychiatrists to
serve interests other than the therapeutic needs of their patients." Responsibility Di-
lemma, supra note 1, at 274. "Since insanity trials fail to elicit the institutional biases
that lend to particular interests, the indigent defendant, as a result of his inability to
secure an independent expert, is fundamentally prejudiced in his attempt to raise this
affirmative defense provided by law." Id. See also, e.g., Whatley, Indigents and the In-
sanity Defense, 3 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 115, 121 (1977).
271. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
272. Id.
It is in such cases that a defense may be devastated by the absence of a
psychiatric examination and testimony; with such assistance, the defendant
might have a reasonable chance of success. In such circumstance, where the po-
tential accuracy of the jury's determination is so dramatically enhanced, and
where the interests of the individual and the State in an accurate proceeding are
substantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield.
Id. (footnote omitted).
273. Id. The court emphasized that this did not give the defendant access to "choose
a psychiatrist of his personal liking," id.; its concern was simply that an indigent defend-
ant "have access to a competent psychiatrist"; id. Cf. In re Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104,
301 A.2d 493 (Somerset Co. Ct. 1977) (indigent in civil commitment case has no right "to
shop around for a psychiatrist who agrees with him").
274. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
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such psychiatric testimony, 275 "at least where the defendant has
had access to an expert of his own, 27 6 the Court found that this
holding relied, "in part, on the assumption that the factfinder
would have before it both the prosecutor's psychiatrists and the
opposing views of the defendant's doctors and would therefore
be competent to 'uncover, recognize, and take due account of
.. . shortcomings' in predictions on this point. '277 Where the
consequence of error is so great, the relevance so evident and the
burden on the State so slim, due process thus requires "access to
a psychiatric examination" for assistance in the preparation of
the sentencing phase.7 8
The Court disposed of the argument that Baldi controlled,
noting first that the defendant there had been examined by neu-
tral psychiatrists,279 and, more importantly, that Baldi predated
the "extraordinarily enhanced role of psychiatry in criminal law
today,"280 and the Court's recognition of certain "elemental con-
stitutional rights, each of which has enhanced the ability of an
indigent defendant to attain a fair hearing, [and which] has sig-
naled our increased commitment to assuring meaningful access
to the judicial process. "281
275. Id., citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
276. Id., citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.5 (1983).
277. Id., quoting, in part, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983).
278. Id. The links between Barefoot and Ake were presciently noted in Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 160 (1984) (Barefoot majority's
focus on "opposing views of defendant's doctors," 463 U.S. at 899, suggests that "when
there are none the adversary system may not function adequately"); id. at 161 (question-
ing whether indigent defendant will be able to obtain "meaningful consultation").
Slobogin argues persuasively that Barefoot "arrives at the wrong conclusion," Id. at 163:
Given the low probative value of expert clinical predictions of dangerous-
ness and the heightened possibility of undue reliance by the factfinder on such
testimony when it is unopposed, the due process clause should bar its admission
unless the defendant chooses to rely upon clinical prediction testimony. Despite
the Court's inference to the contrary, the mere opportunity to obtain expert as-
sistance or to make reference to current research about the general unreliability
of dangerousness predictions should not weaken the due process claim, since
neither of these devices significantly improves the adversary system's ability to
pinpoint erroneous testimony.
Id. He concludes that "the fact finder should be presented with only the most reliable
information in the least prejudicial way." Id. at 165.
279. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1098, relying on Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190; California v. Ramos,
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On the facts of the case before it, the Court found it "clear
that [defendant's] mental state at the time of the offense was a
substantial factor in his defense, '2 2 and that his future danger-
ousness was also "a significant factor at the sentencing
phase."28 The denial of his requests for psychiatric assistance
thus violated the Due Process Clause, and the case was reversed
and remanded for a new trial.2 4
Chief Justice Burger concurred, suggesting that "nothing in
the Court's opinion reaches non-capital cases."2 85 Justice Rehn-
quist dissented, criticizing the Court's constitutional rule as "far
too broad,'28 6 indicating that he would limit the rule to capital
cases and "make clear that the entitlement is to an independent
psychiatric evaluation, not to a defense consultant.
287
There has been little case law and virtually no commentary
on Ake in the period since the Court's decision, although both
the breadth of the Court's decision and the selection of Justice
Marshall as its author have been noted. 88 And of course, Ake is
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1099.
284. Id.
285. Id. (Burger, CJ., concurring).
286. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist would require a "considerably
greater showing" of need than demonstrated by defendant here, see id. at 1101, sug-
gesting that defendant's behavior could well have been feigned, id. but see sources cited
supra note 248. He concluded:
Finally, even if I were to agree with the court that some right to a state-
appointed psychiatrist should be recognized here, I would not grant the broad
right to "access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the de-
fense." Ake, at 1097. A psychiatrist is not an attorney, whose job it is to advo-
cate. His opinion is sought on a question that the State of Oklahoma treats as a
question of fact. Since any "unfairness" in these cases would arise from the fact
that the only competent witnesses on the question are being hired by the State,
all the defendant should be entitled to is one competent opinion-whatever the
witness' conclusion-from a psychiatrist who acts independently of the prosecu-
tor's office. Although the independent psychiatrist should be available to answer
defense counsel's questions prior to trial, and to testify if called, I see no reason
why the defendant should be entitled to an opposing view, or to a "defense"
advocate.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.
287. Id. at 1101-02 (emphasis in original).
288. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Supreme Court: Of Meaty Tea Leaves and Other Baffle-
ments, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1985, at A26 (writing the Ake opinion characterized as "the
meatiest assignment that Justice Marshall has received in years"); Lauter, The Justices'
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consistent with pre-existing practices in more that 80% of all
American jurisdictions.2 89 We still must wait, however, to see
how broadly the Court expects Ake to be read in parallel
200situations.
2g
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE MEANING OF
"ADEQUACY"
To a great extent, the development of constitutional crimi-
nal procedure over the past half century has tracked the ex-
panding jurisprudence of the constitutional right to counsel at a
criminal trial.291 The Supreme Court's simple but eloquent evo-
cation in the "Scottsboro Boys" case 292 -that "the right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel" 29 3-established "[un-
mistakable] conclusions about the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel" 291 as "one of the safeguards of the sixth
amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty. '295 These "conclusions" were rearticu-
lated in the "monumental ' 296 decision of Gideon v. Wain-
wright,297 holding that the right of an indigent defendant in a
criminal trial to the assistance of counsel was one of the "funda-
Battle of the Footnotes Begins; Psychiatric Ruling's Scope Surprising, Nat'l L.J., Mar.
11, 1985, at 5 ("even the most optimistic on the criminal defense side were surprised at
the opinion's breadth").
Recent cases citing Ake include Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1985);
Vassar v. Solem, 763 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1985); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.
1985); U.S. v. Flynt, No. 84-5041, slip op. (9th Cir. March 28, 1985); Bowden v. Kemp,
767 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1985); Groseclose v. Dutton, 609 F. Supp. 1432 (M.D. Tenn.
1985). For law review articles discussing Ake, see Note, Due Process and Psychiatric
Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 21 TULSA L.J. 121 (1985); Note, An Indigent's Constitu-
tional Right to Expert Psychiatric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957 (1985).
289. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. at 1094-95.
290. Although the Court had granted certiorari in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 53
U.S.L.W. 3269 (Oct. 9, 1985), another "access to defense services" case, the Court re-
versed and remanded that case without reaching the Ake issue. 53 U.S.L.W. 4743, 4744
(June 11, 1985) (No. 83-6607).
291. See infra text accompanying notes 292-309.
292. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
293. Id. at 68-69.
294. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
295. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
296. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Gideon's Realities].
297. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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mental safeguards of liberty. . . protected against state invasion
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""'
Following Gideon, the Supreme Court-on various due pro-
cess and equal protection theories""-has expanded the indi-
gent's right to counsel both horizontally (through other stages of
the criminal process) and vertically (beyond mere placement of
"a warm body with a legal pedigree next to an indigent defend-
ant").300 A constitutional right to counsel has thus been found to
attach to misdemeanor prosecutions where a defendant is sub-
ject to actual imprisonment,801 to appeals "as to right,"302 and at
"critical stages" in the criminal prosecution. 303 It has also been
found to apply to parole or probation revocation hearings, where
needed to ensure the effectiveness of the hearing rights guaran-
teed by due process.304 To make the trial (and appeal) process
meaningful, the Supreme Court expanded its earlier holding of
Griffin v. Illinois30 5-that, if a state chose to grant defendants a
right to appeal, due process and equal protection compelled it to
provide a trial transcript for an indigent defendant who other-
wise could not perfect his appeal30 6-in a series of cases involv-
ing the use of transcripts for collateral attack on convictions,3 0 7
298. Id. at 341. The Court in Gideon overruled its prior decision in Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455, 472 (1942) (which held that refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent
felony defendant did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment),
characterizing Betts as "an anachronism when handed down." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345
(quoting amicus curiae brief filed by 22 states on appellant's behalf).
299. The different doctrines are discussed extensively in 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE (1984) §§ 11.1-11.2, at 1-29.
300. Gideon's Realities, supra note 296, at 819.
301. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
302. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
303. The test for assistance here is whether "substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected." Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). Under this rubric, the right
has been found to attach at preliminary hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10
(1970); at certain pretrial identification procedures, see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967) (post-indictment lineups); when the defendant is subjected to
governmental attempts to elicit inculpatory statements, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); and at pretrial psychiatric interviews, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981).
304. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
305. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
306. Id. at 18. Griffin, of course, is the source of Justice Black's famous dictum:
"There can be no legal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has." Id. at 19.
307. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
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for habeas corpus proceedings, 08 and for trial preparation."
Notwithstanding the lofty aspirations reflected in these de-
cisions, the reality turned out to be somewhat less sanguine.
Writing thirteen years after the Gideon decision, Chief Judge
David Bazelon observed with customary pith:
The harsh truth is, however, that although we generals of
the judiciary have designed inspiring insignia for the
standard, the battle for equal justice is being lost in the
trenches of the criminal courts where the promise of
Gideon and Argersinger [v. HamlinP1 ° goes unfulfilled.
The casualties of these defeats are easy to identify ...
The prime casualties are defendants accused of street
crimes, virtually all of whom are poor, uneducated, and
unemployed. They are the persons being represented all
too often by "walking violations of the Sixth
Amendment."3 1'
Judge Bazelon surveyed the options available to the indi-
gent defendant who relies on appointed counsel, and found them
all wanting. The first group of counsel-"the regu-
lars"-consisted mostly of a "cache of mediocre lawyers,9
3 1 2
"often incompetent, indifferent or driven by greed, they are con-
cerned only with copping a plea and their fee."31 8 Judge Bazelon
reasoned that they were "drawn into the ranks of the 'cop-out
bar' by either the economic necessity of inadequate fee struc-
tures or the need to curry favor with plea-hungry judges who
have the life-and-death power to appoint counsel and fix their
compensation."
3 14
The second group-the more affluent "uptown lawyers" who
handled the bulk of appointed cases in the "bad old days" '15
308. Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367
(1969).
309. Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (use of preliminary hearing transcript).
310. Gideon's Realities, supra note 296, at 811-12, (quoting, in part, Bazelon, The
Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973)).
311. Id. at 813 (quoting Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, 1967
A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 21, at 25).
312. Id. (citing, inter alia, DOWNIE, JUSTICE DENIED 174-77 (1971)).
313. Id. (citation omitted).
314. Id.
315. Id. "The lawyers gained a visceral understanding of the plight of those charged
with crime; the system gained forceful advocates for reform; clinical practice gained
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before Gideon-subsequently diminished in importance. While
these lawyers had brought certain intangible benefits to the
criminal trial process, 16 representation was still often ineffective
because of this group's general unfamiliarity with the criminal
system, "particularly with those informal norms of police, prose-
cutors, and courts that cannot be learned from books. 's17
The third group-public defenders-"unquestionably has
brought about a major improvement in the quality of defense
services,"' ' s but this improvement "gives no justification for
complacency." ' "The high quality representation" which Judge
Bazelon found in the District of Columbia's Public Defender
system was "an exception, not the rule" in national practice.320
In sum, in spite of the ambitious expectations of Gideon, the
reality of representation fell far short of the mark.
This recognition was followed by a flood of decisions which
attempted to give life to the notion that a criminal defendant
had a right to the "effective" assistance of counsel.321 After years
added respectability by the participation of the leaders of the bar; and defendants fre-
quently gained high-quality representation, as well as the assurance that they were not
being relegated to the legal profession's under class."
316. Id. at 814. For examples of Judge Bazelon's applications of these principles to
the cases, see his dissents in Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 460-61 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), and Jackson v. United States, 336 F.2d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir.
1964) (Bazelon, J., dissenting). As he noted, "No defendant wishes his trial to be the
vehicle for some patent lawyer to master criminal practice." Gideon's Realities, supra
note 296, at 814.
317. Id. For an analysis of the economic, psychological and social factors contributing
to counsel's ineffectiveness, see Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Rep-
resentation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 130-31 (1977). See generally, Perlin & Sadoff,
Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, supra
note 208, at 165-67.
318. Gideon's Realities, supra note 296.
319. Id. at 815. A then contemporaneous survey revealed that, too often, Public De-
fenders were supported by inadequately staffed offices, were faced with unmanageable
caseloads, unsurmountable time restraints, nonexistent training programs or resources,
and the need to "go to trial unprepared and appear at sentencing ... uninformed." Id.
at 815-16 (referring to BENNER & NEARY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973)), summa-
rized in Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some Perspectives on Defense
Services, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 667 (1975); see also CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE (1972).
320. Gideon's Realities, supra note 296, at 815.
321. Powell had first held that aid of counsel had to be "effective" aid, Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932), and the Court repeated the use of the adjective in
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (federal defendant had right to "effective
appointment" of counsel). In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), the
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of allowing the perpetuation of virtually impossible-to-fail tests
such as the "farce or mockery of justice" standards, 22 the Su-
preme Court has subsequently found that a criminal defendant
is "entitled to a reasonably competent attorney.., whose ad-
vice is 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases,' ",23 as part of the constitutional guarantee of
"adequate legal assistance,' '1 24 "a fair trial and a competent at-
torney. '325 This is because "the very premise of our adversary
system. . . is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted
and the innocent go free."3 26 Unless the accused receives the ef-
fective assistance of counsel, "a serious risk of error infects the
trial itself. '327 As the Court underscored last term in United
States v. Cronic,328 "if the process loses its character as a con-
frontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is
Court found that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
(emphasis added). Note that Judge Bazelon hypothesized that, perhaps, "we should re-
place the phrase 'ineffective assistance' with a new term, such as 'failure of the criminal
process,' which properly implicates the system rather than the attorney." Gideon's Reali-
ties, supra note 296, at 823.
322. The "farce or mockery" test, generally traced to Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945), found ineffectiveness of counsel
"only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the con-
science of the reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunctory, in
bad faith, a sham, a pretense," Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965),
quoted in Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 422 F.2d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 1970) and Borchert v.
United States, 405 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied. 394 U.S. 972 (1969), or
where counsel exhibited such "gross incompetence . . . [that] blotted out the essence of
a substantial defense," Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Cases are collected at Strazella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses,
New Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 443, 446 (1977); see also Smithburn & Springman, Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel: In Quest of a Uniform Standard, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
497, 504-06 (1980). These tests have been characterized as requiring "such a minimal
level of performance that [they] themselves mock the Sixth Amendment." Gideon's Re-
alities, supra note 296, at 819.
323. United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044 (1984) (quoting, in part, McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 771 (1970).
324. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).
325. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982).
326. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Herring v. New York, 322 U.S. 853, 862
(1975)); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (plurality opinion).
327. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting in part, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343
(1980)).
328. 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
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violated." '
Cronic was a white-collar crime case involving an elaborate
"check-kiting" scheme. 30 While defendant's sentence was a seri-
ous one-twenty-five years in federal prisonss'-it was clearly
not of the same magnitude as a death sentence, the ultimate
penalty. As the Supreme Court has noted consistently since its
1976 decisions holding that the death penalty was not unconsti-
tutional per se, 3 2 "the need for treating each defendant in a
capital case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of
the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases,"
as a result of the "nonavailability of corrective or modifying
mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence." 33 Or,
as the Court continues to note, "death is different" 334-"unique
in its severity and irrevocability." '
The significance of this "different-ness" is heightened in
any consideration of the quality of representation afforded to
the defendant facing the death penalty, in light of the uncontro-
verted evidence that there is an absolute statistical significance
between economic status and capital punishment.3 6 Would this
329. Id. at 2045-46. The Court quoted Circuit Judge Wyzanski on this point: "While
a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring
with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators."
Id. at 2046 (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975)).
330. 104 S. Ct. at 2042. "Check kiting" is explained in depth in Williams v. United
States, 458 U.S. 279, 280-82 & n.1 (1982).
331. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. at 2042.
332. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). These cases, sometimes known collectively as
the July 2 Cases, are analyzed extensively in Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sen-
tencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor,
66 GEo. L.J. 757 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mental Disorder].
333. Lockett v. Ohio 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983).
334. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
335. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
336. See, e.g., Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 27 (1964); Joyner, Legal Theories for Attacking Racial Disparity in Sentencing,
18 CRIM. L. BULL. 101-02 (1928); Lempert, Capital Punishment in the 80's: Reflections
on the Symposium, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101 (1983); Proportionality Review,
supra note 57, at 429-31. For an historical perspective, see generally, Krivosha, Copple &
McDonough, A Historical and Philosophical Look at the Death Penalty-Does it Serve
Society's Needs?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1983). For an analysis of the backgrounds of
the first eleven men executed since the post-Gregg resumption of capital punishment, see
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in any way be a factor if the Court were to consider an ineffec-
tiveness-of-counsel argument made in the context of a death
penalty case? Would the Court specifically follow the lead of
each of the federal circuits by (1) explicitly rejecting the "farce
and mockery" test,3 37 and (2) by defining (a) what constituted
"reasonably competent" representation, and (b) what role sub-
standard performance should play in determining cases seeking
reversal on that ground?33s Against this background, the Court
granted certiorari in Strickland v. Washington,-3 9 a case argued
in tandem3 40 with Cronic, so as "to consider the standards by
which to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a
criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel."
'341
In Strickland, respondent David Washington was charged
with three capital murder charges in Florida state court.
34 2
When his court-appointed counsel learned that the defendant
had confessed to two of the homicides, he "experienced a sense
of hopelessness about the case," and "cut his [investigation] ef-
forts off.'" 43 Defendant pled guilty to all charges.3 44 At his plea
hearing, he told the court that he was "under extreme stress
caused by his inability to support his family, ' 345 and that he
"accepted responsibility for his crimes. "s4 Against counsel's ad-
vice, defendant waived a jury trial on the question of punish-
ment, and elected to be sentenced by the trial judge without a
jury's recommendation.
3 4
Streib, supra note 11, at 447-74, (especially at 477: "all eleven executions resulted from
criminal homicides of socially 'more valuable' victims").
337. The Second Circuit was the final circuit to abandon the test in Trapnell v.
United States, 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983). For a survey of all circuits see Genego, The
Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Rep-
resentation, 2 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 181, 190 n. 74 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Performance
Standards].
338. Id. at 190.
339. 462 U.S. 1105 (1983).
340. "In tandem" arguments are explained at STERN & GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 14.10 at 752 (5th ed. 1978).
341. Strickland 104 S. Ct. at 2063.
342. Id. at 2056. The crimes are characterized in the Court's opinion as "brutal."
343. Id.






In preparation for the sentencing hearing, defendant's law-
yer spoke to defendant about his background, and talked to de-
fendant's wife and mother on the telephone (although he never
met with either)8 48 He did not seek out character witnesses, nor
did he request a psychiatric examination of defendant. 49 His de-
cision not to present or attempt to seek out evidence "concern-
ing respondent's character and emotional state . . reflected his
sense of hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of
respondent's confession to the gruesome crimes." 8 0
At the sentencing hearing, counsel argued "that respon-
dent's remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified sparing
him from the death penalty," stressing that the defendant had
no significant history of criminal activity and that defendant
"committed the crimes under extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance, thus coming within the statutory list of mitigating cir-
cumstances." 851 He cast defendant as "fundamentally a good
person who had briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful
circumstances.
8 52
The trial judge found numerous aggravating circum-
stances " and "insufficient mitigating circumstances" to out-
weigh them,5  and sentenced defendant to death.' " The Florida




351. Id. Under the Florida death penalty law, "mitigating circumstances" include the
following:
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1985).
For a general history of the role of mental disorder as a mitigating factor in death
penalty cases, see Mental Disorder, supra note 332, at 790-806, and sources cited in
notes 402-62.
352. 104 S. Ct. at 2057.
353. See factors listed in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985).





Defendant then sought collateral relief in state court, argu-
ing in part that he received inadequate representation at sen-
tencing in six different ways. He charged that counsel failed (1)
to request a psychiatric evaluation, (2) to investigate and pre-
sent character witnesses, (3) to move for a continuance to ade-
quately prepare for sentencing, (4) to seek a pre-sentence inves-
tigation report,3 57 (5) to present meaningful arguments to the
sentencing judge, and (6) to investigate the medical examiner's
reports (or cross-examine the state's medical experts) as to the
manner of death of the victims. 58 In supporting this claim,
counsel submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors
and relatives, stating that they would have testified on defend-
ant's behalf, had they been so requested, as well as psychiatric
and psychological reports finding that, while defendant was not
under "extreme mental or emotional disturbance," he was
"chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic
dilemma" at the time of his crimes. " The trial court denied re-
lief, finding that defendant's attorney had acted competently.
Further, even had trial counsel done everything urged by de-
fendant (through his new lawyers) in his post-conviction peti-
tion, "there [was] not even the remotest chance that the out-
come would have been any different." 6" He characterized the
aggravating circumstances as "overwhelming." '61 This judgment
was similarly affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court.
36 2
Defendant subsequently sought federal habeas corpus re-
view, raising primarily the same arguments.63 After conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief, holding
that, while trial counsel had made "errors in judgment" in fail-
ing to investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence, there was no
356. Washington v. State, 362 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937
(1979).
357. Counsel had indicated that he specifically declined to request the preparation of
such a report "because he judged that [it] might prove more detrimental than helpful."
104 S. Ct. at 2057.
358. Id. at 2058.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 2059.
361. Id. (emphasis in original).
362. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981).
363. 104 S. Ct. at 2060.
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showing of resulting prejudice. 6 On appeal, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit 365 reversed and remanded for additional fact-finding under
new standards set out in its opinion. 6 In determining whether
defense counsel fulfilled his "duty to investigate," the circuit
court found that-absent "outright denial of counsel, of affirma-
tive government interference in the representation process, or of
inherently prejudicial conflicts of interest" (in which cases no
special showing of prejudice must be made) 367 -the defendant
must show that counsel's errors "resulted in actual and substan-
tial disadvantage to the course of his defense. 368 The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine if this were
the proper formulation of the standard,
3 69 and reversed.3 70
The Court reviewed its prior decisions in the area, and con-
cluded that the "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffective-
ness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial can-
not be relied on as having produced a just result.3171 After not-
364. Id.
365. First, the appeal was heard by a panel of the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed in
part, vacated in part and remanded with instructions to apply to the particular facts the
framework for analyzing ineffectiveness claims it had developed in its opinion. Id. (citing
Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 906-07 (5th Cir. 1982)). Unit B of the Fifth
Circuit then granted the state's petition for en banc rehearing. Washington v. Strickland,
679 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B). Unit B ultimately became the Eleventh Circuit. See
Appellate Court Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 9(1), 94 Stat. 1994,
1995 (1980).
366. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 1982). Under these
standards, criminal defendants had the right to "counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." Id. at
1250. Such assistance must include a "reasonable amount of pretrial investigation," id. at
1251, reflecting "'informed, professional deliberation' rather than 'inexcusable ignorance
or senseless disregard of their clients' rights'" id. (quoting, in part, United States v.
Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1122 (lst Cir. 1978)). While the "amount of pretrial investigation
that is reasonable defies precise measurement," it depends on a variety of factors: "the
number of issues in the case, the relative complexity of those issues, the strength of the
government's case, and the overall strategy of trial counsel." Id.
367. Id. at 1258-59.
368. Id. at 1262.
369. 104 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
370. Id. at 2071.
371. Id. at 2064. Defendant's counsel before the Supreme Court stressed five reasons
why Washington's trial counsel's failure to "conduct any independent investigation for
mitigating information . . . severely impaired the . . . presentation of his case at a capi-
tal sentencing hearing." Respondent's Brief at 93, Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Respondent's Brief]
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ing that the role of counsel at a capital sentencing proceeding
was comparable to counsel's role at trial (as opposed to counsel's
role at "an ordinary sentencing")3 72 the Court established a two-
First, the stakes were life and death.
Second, the district court explicitly found that defendant's trial counsel
ceased any preparation or investigation of respondent's case out of a sense of
hopelessness and despair after respondent confessed to three murders. Counsel
never attempted to undertake the role of an active and zealous advocate for his
client's life. The integrity and fairness of the adversary proceedings were wholly
undermined by the essential withdrawal of defense counsel from the sentencing
process.
Third, counsel was unable to provide a "guiding hand" at sentencing be-
cause he lacked the indispensable factual prerequisites for the exercise of in-
formed judgment. The district court found as a fact that [defendant's trial coun-
sel] did not seek any witnesses in mitigating (Pet. App. 264-65), nor did he
conduct "an independent investigation into petitioner's background and poten-
tially mitigating emotional and mental reasons for the killings." (Pet. App. 282).
Without this factual information, counsel could do little more than rely on re-
spondent's statements at the guilty plea proceedings (J.A. 322-23); he certainly
could not meaningfully advise the respondent on what mitigating information
could and should be presented to the sentencer. [Defendant's trial counsel's]
"total abdication of duty should never be viewed as permissible trial strategy."
Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d 1455, 1467 (1983).
Fourth, counsel's inadequate preparation resulted in the impoverishment of
the record, depriving the sentencer of the knowledge about the character and
background of the defendant that is indispensable to an "individualized deter-
mination" of whether life or death is the proper punishment. Zant v. Stephens,
103 S. Ct. at 2743-44; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1902); Wood-
son v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304.
Fifth, the subtle influences that are involved in reaching a life or death deci-
sion under Florida law make it particularly difficult to assess the impact of coun-
sel's errors upon a record thus impoverished. Under Florida's capital sentencing
scheme, "even if the statutory threshold has been crossed and the defendant is
in the narrow class of persons who are subject to the death penalty, the sentenc-
ing authority is not required to impose the death penalty."Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939, 954 (1983); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973). Indeed, the
Florida courts have developed a series of precedents "in which, even though
statutory mitigating circumstances do not outweigh statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances, the addition of non-statutory mitigating circumstances tips the
scales in favor of life imprisonment." Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. at 954-55. Nu-
merous Florida cases emphasize the critical, often determinative, significance of
non-statutory mitigating information that Florida sentencers have repeatedly
employed in their capital setencing calculus.
In sum, respondent has shown that he did not receive representation within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Consequently,
counsel's ineffectiveness impaired the presentation of the defense at his capital
sentencing hearing.
Id. at 93-99 (footnotes omitted).
372. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. That role was articulated as "ensur[ing] that the
adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing
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part test to determine whether a defendant's claim that coun-
sel's assistance was "so defective as to require reversal '' M should
prevail:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's perform-
ance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the sixth
amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This re-
quires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence re-
sulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that




374. Id. Respondent's Supreme Court counsel had urged, on the other hand, that the
inquiry be phrased in light of "the basic functions counsel serves," Respondent's Brief,
supra note 371, at 20:
(Counsel] is a "guiding hand" to the accused through the legal process and a
critical leg of the adversary process, a counterweight to the prosecutor. An attor-
ney must, therefore, discharge certain basic responsibilities. He must: (1) func-
tion as an active advocate, providing "[u]ndivided allegiance and faithful, de-
voted service to a client." VonMoltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1945); (2) act
as an informed advisor by providing the lawyer's skilled perspective on the case;
and (3) conduct an adequate factual and legal investigation in order to be able to
fulfill his advisory role in a proper manner.
The responsibility must be adequately discharged at sentencing as well as :at
trial. Particularly in the area of capital sentencing, effective counsel serves to
ensure an individualized determination of life or death based on the character
and background of the offender and the circumstances of the offense. Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
Id. at 20-21.
Counsel also had urged the court to reject the "outcome determinative test":
To prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a defend-
ant must establish an adverse impact on the presentation of the case or other
impairment to the defense from counsel's errors, not' that the outcome would
have been different with adequate counsel. The outcome determinative test is
wholly inappropriate: It forces the federal courts to retry issues of guilt and pen-
alty and to speculate on how the record might have been different and how those
differences might have altered the perceptions of the original trier of fact. In-
stead of principled decisions focusing on an attorney's performance, the out-
come-determinative test would generate a series of subjective judgments as to
whether a person was properly convicted or sentenced. These would provide no
1985] DULLING THE AKE 151
The proper standard for attorney performance is that of
"reasonably effective assistance." '375 This is an "objective" stan-
dard,70 measured by "simple reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms."'3 7 Judicial scrutiny of counsel's perform-
ance under such circumstances "must be highly deferential,
'37 8
and:
[B]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evalu-
ation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasona-
ble professional assistance. That is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action "might be considered sound trial
strategy.
'37 9
Warning that "[t]he availability of intrusive post-trial in-
quiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its
evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges,"380 the Court instructed that an "actual ineffective-
ness claim" must be assessed "on the facts of the particular case,
guidance to conscientious counsel or reviewing courts.
In applying a standard of prejudice that focuses on the impairment to the
defense, courts will necessarily be guided by certain factors: (1) the extent to
which the defect in counsel's performance deprives the defendant of the essen-
tial attributes of counsel; (2) whether counsel's errors resulted in an impoverish-
ment of the record; (3) the pervasiveness of counsel's derelictions; and (4) the
nature and seriousness of the issues at stake.
Id. at 21-23.
375. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
376. Id. at 2065.
377. Id. Under this test the court found that counsel owed his/her client "certain
basic duties."
Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the
client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sulli-
van, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980). From counsel's function as assistant to the defend-
ant derives the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more
particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to
keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as
will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. See Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
Id.
378. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
379. Id. at 2065-66 (citation omitted).
380. Id. at 2066. The Court offered no authority to support this assertion.
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viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct":38'
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective as-
sistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine,
whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of profes-
sionally competent assistance. In making that determina-
tion, the court should keep in mind that counsel's func-
tion, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to
make the adversarial testing process work in the particu-
lar case. At the same time, the court should recognize
that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered ade-
quate assistance and made all significant decisions in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. 82
Applying this standard to the case in question-where the
issue was whether counsel fulfilled his duty to investigate-the
Court found that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable inves-
tigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary."' " "In any effectiveness case," the
Court continued, "a particular decision not to investigate must
be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances,
applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's
judgments." 8
Even a "professionally unreasonable"' 85 error will not result
in the reversal of a conviction, however, "if the error had no ef-
fect on the judgment[;] .. .any deficiencies in the counsel's per-
formance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to consti-
tute ineffective assistance under the Constitution. '" 386 To show
prejudice, "defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the re-





385. Id. at 2067.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 2068.
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defined "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. 388 Given this test, when
a defendant challenges a death sentence, the question is
"whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the er-
rors, the sentencer-including an appellate court to the extent it
independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
did not warrant death."
' 9
Applying these principles to the case before the Court was
"not difficult."390 It found that respondent's trial counsel's con-
duct "cannot be found unreasonable," ' and that, even assum-
ing unreasonableness, "respondent suffered insufficient prejudice
to warrant setting aside his death sentence. 39 2 The Court char-
acterized trial counsel as having made a "strategic choice,"3 93
with nothing in the record showing that his "sense of hopeless-
ness distorted his professional judgment." 39 ' "Counsel's strategy
choice was well within the range of professionally reasonable
judgment, and the decision not to seek more character or psy-
chological evidence than was already in hand was likewise rea-
sonable." ' In short, "[f]ailure to make the required showing of
388. Id. The court rejected respondent's suggestion that the proper test would be
whether the errors "impaired the presentation of the defense," citing Respondent's
Brief, supra note 371, at 58, on the theory that that standard provided "no workable
principle" in that "it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently seri-
ous to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding." Id.
The Court's opinion fails to note that respondent cited seven scholarly sources sug-
gesting the development of guidelines to assess prejudice through an impairment per-
spective. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 371, at 60 n.46, (citing Note, A New Focus
on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Stan-
dard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29 (1983); Comment, A Coherent Approach to Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1516 (1983); Smithburn & Springman,
supra note 322; Laseter, The Role of Harm in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases:
Procedure and Policy, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 759 (1981); Erickson, Standards of Compe-
tency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 233 (1980); Finer,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1070 (1973); Note, A Functional
Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1053 (1980)).
389. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.




394. Id. at 2071.
395. Id. With respect to the question of prejudice, "the lack of merit of respondent's
claim is even more stark":
The evidence that respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at
19851
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either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the
ineffectiveness claim."39 "More generally," the Court concluded,
"respondent has made no showing that the justice of his sen-
tence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary
process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance";3 9 7 thus,
"the sentencing proceeding was not fundamentally unfair. '39 8
Justice Brennan filed a separate opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.39 While he joined in the majority's opin-
ion because it provided "helpful guidance" 400 to lower courts, he
cautioned that the standards "can and should be applied with
concern for the special considerations that must attend review of
counsel's performance in a capital sentencing proceeding.
401
the sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing profile
presented to the sentencing judge. As the state courts and the District Court
found, at most this evidence shows that numerous people who knew respondent
thought he was generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psycholo-
gist believed he was under considerable emotional stress that did not rise to the
level of extreme disturbance. Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there
is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the
conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating cir-
cumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed. Indeed, admission of the evidence
respondent now offers might even have been harmful to his case: his "rap sheet"
would probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological reports
would have directly contradicted respondent's claim that the mitigating circum-




398. Washington's petition for rehearing was denied, see 104 S. Ct. 3562 (1984), and
he was put to death on July 13, 1984; See also Supreme Court Turns Down Plea for
Stay of Murderer's Execution, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1984, at A-14, col. 5.
399. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2071 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Brennan dissented from the Court's judgment and adhered to his view that the death
sentence is in all circumstances unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 2061-72 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
400. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2071, 2072 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
401. Id. at 2073. Justice Brennan emphasized that "discretion must be suitably di-
rected and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action,"
id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983)). Thus, the Court has "consist-
ently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding," Strickland, 104 S.
Ct. at 2073. Because of the basic differences between the death penalty and all other
punishments, the Court has recognized that there is "a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case." Id. at 2074 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 914 (1983) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)). Barefoot is discussed infra text accompanying notes 26-160.
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Justice Marshall dissented," 2 characterizing the majority's ef-
forts as "unhelpful, 403 and criticizing the adoption of a per-
formance standard "that is so malleable that, in practice, it will
either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the
manner in which the sixth amendment is interpreted."404 By the
vagueness of its holding, he charged, the Court has "not only
abdicated its own responsibility to interpret the Constitution,
but also impaired the ability of the lower courts to exercise
theirs."'405 Even beyond the "debilitating ambiguity"'40 6 of the
Court's standard (which will likely "stunt the development of
constitutional doctrine in this area") 4 7 and the majority's "re-
grettable '40 8 discussion of the presumption of reasonableness to
be afforded to counsel's decision under the test, Justice Marshall
took sharp issue with the majority's characterization of the capi-
tal sentencing proceeding as indistinguishable from an ordinary
trial.4 09
"The Constitution requires a stricter adherence to proce-
dural safeguards in a capital case than in other cases, '4 10 he em-
phasized, since defense counsel's performance "is a crucial com-
ponent of the system of protections designed to ensure that
capital punishment is administered with some degree of ration-
ality."1411 Marshall further asserted:
Because it is "essential" in the sentencing phase of a capital case that "the [fact-
finder] have. . . all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose
fate it must determine," Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2071, 2074 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976)) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens)), the "sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant
mitigating factor," Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2074 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 112 (1982)). Thus Justice Brennan concluded, "[C]ounsel's general duty to in-
vestigate . . . takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of developing
mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury considering the sentence of death;
claims of ineffective assistance in the performance of that duty should therefore be con-
sidered with commensurate care." Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2074.





407. Id. at 2076.
408. Id. at 2077.
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[R]eliability in the imposition of the death sentence can
be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed
of "all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine." The job of
amassing that information and presenting it in an organ-
ized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is entrusted
principally to the defendant's lawyer. The importance to
the process of counsel's efforts, combined with the sever-
ity and irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require
that the standards for determining what constitutes "ef-
fective assistance" be applied especially stringently in
capital sentencing proceedings.412
412. Id. (citation omitted). These views led Justice Marshall to dissent from the
Court's disposition of the case:
It is undisputed that respondent's trial counsel made virtually no investiga-
tion of the possibility of obtaining testimony from respondent's relatives,
friends, or former employers pertaining to respondent's character or background.
Had counsel done so, he would have found several persons willing and able to
testify that, in their experience, respondent was a responsible, nonviolent man,
devoted to his family, and active in the affairs of his church. See App. 338-365.
Respondent contends that his lawyer could have and should have used that tes-
timony to "humanize" respondent, to counteract the impression conveyed by the
trial that he was little more than a cold-blooded killer. Had this evidence been
admitted, respondent argues, his chances of obtaining a life sentence would have
been significantly better.
Measured against the standards outlined above, respondent's contentions
are substantial. Experienced members of the death-penalty bar have long recog-
nized the crucial importance of adducing evidence at a sentencing proceeding
that establishes the defendant's social and familial connections. See Goodpaster,
The Trial for Life; Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U.L. REV. 299, 300-02, 334-35 (1983). The State makes a colorable-though
in my view not compelling-argument that defense counsel in this case might
have made a reasonable "strategic" decision not to present such evidence at the
sentencing hearing on the assumption that an unadorned acknowledgement of
respondent's responsibility for his crimes would be more likely to appeal to the
trial judge, who was reputed to respect persons who accepted responsibility for
their actions. But however justifiable such a choice might have been after coun-
sel had fairly assessed the potential strength of the mitigating evidence available
to him, counsel's failure to make any significant effort to find out what evidence
might be garnered from respondent's relatives and acquaintances surely cannot
be described as "reasonable." Counsel's failure to investigate is particularly sus-
picious in light of his candid admission that respondent's confessions and con-
duct in the courts of the trial gave him a feeling of hopelessness regarding the
possibility of saving respondent's life, see App. 383-384, 400-401.
If counsel had investigated the availability of mitigating evidence, he might
well have decided to present some such material at the hearing. If he had done
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Because of the special circumstances of a death case, Justice
Marshall would establish different standards for assessing attor-
ney performance:
In my view, a person on death row, whose counsel's per-
formance fell below constitutionally acceptable levels,
should not be compelled to demonstrate a "reasonable
probability" that he would have been given a life sen-
tence if his lawyer had been competent . . . . [I]f the de-
fendant can establish a significant chance that the out-
come would have been different, he surely should be
entitled to a redetermination of his fate.""
The first comprehensive analysis of Strickland character-
ized the Court's approach as "unfortunate and misguided," and
as having "failed to meet its obligation to help ensure that crim-
inal defendants receive competent representation.""' According
to the critic, 1 5 the majority crafted its opinion "to ensure that
the review test will produce the same results as the old 'farce
and mockery-due process' test."'16 The application of the Su-
preme Court's new test to the facts of Strickland underscores




The problems with the Court's holding are reflected in its
treatment of trial counsel's failure to obtain a psychiatric evalu-
ation in preparation for his client's capital sentencing hearing.
Although a state-ordered psychiatric evaluation had found that
there was "no indication of major medical illness at the time of
the crime, '', 8 and although defendant had told the trial judge at
so, there is a significant chance that respondent would have been given a life
sentence. In my view, those possibilities, conjoined with the unreasonableness of
counsel's failure to investigate, are more than sufficient to establish a violation of
the Sixth Amendment and to entitle respondent to a new sentencing proceeding.
I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 2080-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
413. Id.
414. Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 182.
415. Genego, the author of the article, was Chairperson of the Competency Commit-
tee of the ABA Section of Criminal Justice.
416. Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 196.
417. See generally id. at 196-98; 209-11. See also Note, The Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Quandry: The Debate Continues, 18 AKRON L. REV. 325, 334 (1984) (Strick-
land's seemingly "objective" reasonably-effective-assistance test is "poisoned with obtru-
sive subjectivity").
418. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2059.
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his plea entry that he was suffering from "extreme stress,"'119
trial counsel-who subsequently stated that he received no indi-
cations from defendant of any psychological problems"2'- "did
not undertake any efforts to explore [defendant's] mental state
in order to use psychological distress as a basis for mitigation at
the death penalty hearing."' 2
A psychiatric evaluation "might have established the exis-
tence of a mental disturbance that could have supported a find-
ing of a mitigating factor' ' 422 or at least "substantiated [defend-
ant's] claim that he was acting under "extreme mental stress."'
' 23
Yet, the Court characterized trial counsel's decision to forego
such an examination as a "reasonable" decision,' 2 ' and a plausi-
ble strategic choice. 42' How, though, could trial counsel have
come to this "plausible" choice without at least requesting such
419. Id. at 2057.
420. Id.
421. Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 196. At defendant's federal habeas
corpus hearing, affidavits of a psychiatrist and psychologist were introduced to provide
"information relevant to the issue of mental or emotional stress." Respondent's Brief,
supra note 371, at 12 (quoting Court of Appeals' Record at 58). The affiants concluded
that, "while Mr. Washington was legally sane at the time of the crimes, his violent ac-
tions were attributable to the uncontrollable eruption of long-suppressed feelings of self-
hatred and anger generated by exposure to extensive child abuse, incest and a broken
and violent family situation, combined with the severe frustration and depression con-
cerning his financial problems." Id. at 13. A second psychiatric affidavit was submitted to
the District Court, following the defendant's habeas corpus hearing; this report found
that, at the time of the crimes, defendant "was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, and that he was unable to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law." Respondent's Brief, supra note 371, at 12 n.13 (citing J.A. 495-503).
422. Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 196.
423. Id. at 196-97.
424. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2071.
425. Id. at 2070. Of course, trial counsel had conceded that, after defendant con-
fessed, he did not feel that "there was anything which [he] ...could do which was going
to save [defendant] from his fate," Respondent's Brief, supra note 371, at 3 (quoting
J.A. 400), and that his despair over the confession resulted in a "cessation and end" to
his preparation, id. (quoting J.A. 426). As trial counsel himself testified at defendant's
habeas hearing:
I really could find very little to address myself to in terms of a relevant,
cogent presentation of mitigating circumstances as outlined by the statute itself
and certainly insofar as aggravating circumstances are concerned, I . . .did not
feel exactly like I ...had sufficient ammunition to persuade anybody that the
State was not going to succeed in showing at least that they outweighed the
mitigating circumstances.
Id. at 8 (quoting J.A. 404).
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an examination? 426 "Washington had everything to gain and
nothing to lose from a defense-initiated psychiatric examination,
and the defense attorney could not have known the value of a
report before one was made. ' 427 To merely suggest-without
supporting authority or explanation-that counsel could have
"surmise[d]" from his own conversations with defendant "that
psychological evidence would be of little help '428 begs the ques-
tion. The importance of psychiatric evidence at the sentencing
phase to evaluate mental disorder as a potential mitigating fac-
tor cannot be questioned 429 in that "clear evidence indicates
that, since the medieval period, Anglo-American law has ac-
cepted special treatment, and often has permitted mitigation,
when a criminal is afflicted with a mental abnormality. 430
In short, the absence of workable standards in Strick-
land431-as underscored by the Court's refusal to characterize
trial counsel's performance as ineffective 432 _-"is a clear signal
426. Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 197. If such a report had been com-
missioned and turned out to be unhelpful, counsel could have simply chosen to not intro-
duce it. Id.
427. Id.
428. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2071.
429. See generally, Mental Disorder, supra note 332.
430. Id. at 791. The authors trace these developments to at least the "eleventh and
twelfth centuries." Id. See 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 18 (1968).
Even earlier commentary appears in Roman law in an imperial "rescript" issued by the
brother emperors Marcus Aurelius (AD 120-180) and Commodus (AD 161-192) during
the period of their joint reign (AD 177-180). See 2 Scorr ED., THE CIVIL LAW 259 (1973).
See generally, Ake NJPDA Brief, supra note 197, at 7-11 & nn.5-6.
431. Performance standards would have apprised Washington's lawyer of the in-
formation and factors he should have considered in deciding whether to have
Washington examined by a defense psychiatrist and whether to present
favorable character evidence. Standards would have specifically alerted Wash-
ington's lawyer to the need to consider the use of a psychiatrist's testimony to
establish a statutory mitigating factor. More importantly, standards would have
identified the information the attorney should have considered and obtained, if
possible, in order to evaluate whether or not to obtain psychiatric tests for his
client. Standards would have made the attorney aware that he should, when
presented with claims of severe mental distress such as that of Washington, look
beyond the state psychiatrist's report. Standards would have warned the attor-
ney that he should not rely on his own subjective, untrained perceptions of
Washington's mental state.
Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 209-10 (citation omitted).
432. Trial counsel's failure to interview character witnesses, fourteen of whom filed
affidavits at defendant's habeas proceeding, Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2058, similary re-
flected wholly inadequate investigation. He conceded that the full range of his efforts to
obtain mitigating character evidence consisted of telephone conversations with defend-
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that [the Supreme] Court is not at all disturbed with inadequate
performance by criminal defense lawyers. ' '43 3 It appears that
"the Supreme Court has sent a message that the problem of
competency, at least in criminal cases,434 should be taken off the
agenda.
'4 3 1
Although there has not been extensive post-Strickland liti-
gation on the specific question of mental disorder,436 at least one
court has expressed a willingness to attempt to articulate per-
formance standards in this area. In United States ex rel. Rivera
v. Franzen437 a federal district court found that a Strickland-
like performance rendered counsel's assistance ineffective,438 and
remanded for supplemental briefs on the question of actual
ant's wife and mother, id. at 2057; he could thus have no idea of (1) what the fourteen
would have said, or (2) how to assess a fact finder's reaction to such character testimony.
See Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 197-98; cf. Goodpaster, supra note 412,
at 300-02 (examples of character evidence impact at sentencing phase). Note that Justice
Marshall relies on this aspect of Goodpaster's article in his dissent. Strickland, 104 S. Ct.
at 2081.
433. Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 202.
434. This message, of course, contrasts sharply with the Chief Justice's persistent and
incessant cries for improved counsel competency in civil trials. See, e.g., Burger, The
Role of the Law School in Teaching Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (1980); Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certification Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?" 42 FORDHAM
L. REV. 227 (1973); Q and A with the Chief Justice, 71 A.B.A.J. 91 (1985); Burger, The
State of Justice, 70 A.B.A.J. 62 (1984).
435. Performance Standards, supra note 337. Professor Tague has concluded, "Un-
less courts are willing to police the attorney, they should candidly admit that the call for
'effective representation' is simply rhetoric." Tague, supra note 317, at 165.
For one comprehensive set of specific performance standards embodying "an effi-
cient and functional assistance test," see, Note, The Standard for Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Pennsylvania-An Effective Method of Ensuring Competent Defense Repre-
sentation, 86 DICKINSON L. REV. 41, 69-71 (1981-82).
436. Few courts have as of yet been willing to go beyond the words of Strickland.
See, e.g., Ex parte Daniel, 459 So.2d 948 (Ala. 1984); Eirle v. State, 450 So.2d 442 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see also, Dudley v. State, 285 Ark. 160, 685 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Ark.
1985) (no error to not raise insanity defense where defendant had been found competent
to stand trial, "in light of the psychiatric report finding petitioner legally competent,
petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel's decision to employ an
alibi amounted to other than a reasonable professional judgment"); Turner v. Bass, 753
F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985) ("We think defendant's attorneys, in handling the psychiatric
defense, did a professional job in every sense of the word"). Cf. Hemme v. State, 680
S.W.2d 734, 736-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (defendant's guilty plea involuntary where trial
counsel, who had a "doubt" as to her competency to enter it, failed to seek an adjudica-
tion on the issue (Strickland not cited)).
437. 594 F.Supp. 198 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
438. Id. at 204-05.
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prejudice." s
Rivera was a habeas application stemming from petitioner's
prior state court murder conviction,440 based on his allegation
that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and
proffer a potential insanity defense. 4 ' The district court found
that, although petitioner (1) had been institutionalized on four
separate occasions for mental illness, (2) had made several sui-
cide attempts, (3) was taking Thorazine"4 at the time of the
trial,4 43 and although counsel spoke to petitioner on eight sepa-
rate occasions prior to trial, trial counsel never inquired as to
whether petitioner had a history of psychiatric problems, and
never contacted petitioner's family to discuss the case. 4"4 After
reviewing the Strickland test,4" the court set out two questions:
(1) "did [trial counsel's] conversations with Rivera amount to
'reasonable investigation' into a potential insanity defense?" and
if (1) is answered in the negative, (2) "was [counsel's decision
not to further investigate this potential defense] a reasonable
decision in light of all the circumstances, including [counsel's]
conversation with Rivera?
4 46
While the court found counsel conducted "some form" of
439. Id. at 204. Subsequently, the court denied Rivera's petition for failure to show
prejudice under Strickland because he "failed to undermine confidence in his conviction
by showing a reasonable probability that he would have been found not guilty by reason
of insanity had his counsel investigated such a defense." United States ex rel. Rivera v.
Franzen, No. 80-C-5139, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill., May 24, 1985).
440. Id. at 199.
441. Id. For pre-Strickland cases considering counsel's obligation to "discuss" or "ex-
plore" the insanity defense, see, Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 317; see also, supra notes
404-07.
442. Thorazine, a brand name of chlorapromizine, was the first major psychotropic
drug to be developed, and has been used to treat mental illness for over 30 years. See,
e.g., Kinross-Wright, The Current Status on the Phenothiazines, 200 J. A.M.A. 461
(1967); Winick, Psychotropic Drugs and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUND. RES. J. 769, 780. It is considered as "unavoidable unsafe," Stone v. Smith, Kline
& French Laboratories, 731 F.2d 1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1984); and as a "major tranquil-
izer," United States v. Wilson, 471 F.2d 1072, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S.
957 (1973).
443. Rivera, 594 F.Supp. 198, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
444. Id. In fact, as petitioner had informed the probation officer entrusted with the
pretrial report that he had "no mental problems," counsel read this portion of that re-
port into the record of sentencing.
445. Id. at 200 (quoting Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2066).
446. Id. at 202.
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investigation,4 4 7 his level did not constitute " 'reasonable investi-
gation' of the defenses of diminished capacity and insanity.
'44 8
To be "reasonable," such an investigation would have to include
(1) an examination of relevant psychiatric hospital records, (2)
an inquiry into the circumstances of the suicide attempts, (3)
some review of the nature and effects of Thorazine usage and,
perhaps, (4) a psychiatric examination. 4 9 The court found that
counsel impermissibly delegated important strategic choices to
his client; 5 0 by this delegation, counsel "defaulted on his duty to
,make an independent investigation and a reasonable decision to
abandon or pursue further the potential defenses of insanity and
diminished capacity."9
45 1
Even if it could be argued, the court reasoned, that counsel
made a "deliberate decision" to abandon the defenses, that deci-
sion "would have been unreasonable because of [counsel's] al-
most total lack of information. '452 Counsel's failure to make ap-
propriate inquiries resulted in his "reject[ing] the defense
without pursuing the basic inquiries necessary to evaluate its
merits intelligently. 4 53 Counsel's reliance on defendant to bring
to his attention facts in support of an insanity defense was "un-
reasonable precisely because Rivera could not be expected to
know that his psychiatric history afforded him one of the only
two potential defenses available. ' 45 4 Counsel's failure rendered
his assistance ineffective since "the client cannot take on the
role of defense attorney and counsel cannot attempt to adopt
447. Id.
448. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Lee v. Rowe, 446 F. Supp. 1039, 1048 (N.D. Ill.
1978)).
449. Id. See generally, Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1981); Mauldin v.
Wainwright, 723 F.2d 799 (11th Cir. 1984).
450. Rivera, 594 F.Supp. at 203. Defendant had raised to counsel only the possibility
of a self-defense claim. Id. at 200.
451. Id. at 203. See, e.g., Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 843 (1983); Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir. 1983) (defendant's
instruction to counsel to "walk me or fry me" did not excuse counsel's failure to investi-
gate possible intoxication defense). The presentation of the insanity defense has been
appropriately characterized as "probably ... the most demanding task of the defense
lawyer." Kwall, The Use of Expert Services by Privately Retained Criminal Defense
Attorneys, 13 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 1, 17 (1981).
452. Rivera, 594 F. Supp. at 203.
453. Id. (quoting Martin, 711 F.2d at 1280).
454. Id.
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the role of psychiatrist.""55 Because it was impossible to tell
from the state of the record whether petitioner suffered
prejudice within the terms of the Strickland test, the parties
were thus ordered to file supplemental briefs on that point.456
Rivera thus appears to represent a common sense approach
to the problem of counsel's failure to explore a potential insanity
defense after Strickland, and reflects at least the preliminary
resolution of one federal district court's concerns with the issue
of competent representation.457 Importantly, the Rivera court
suggested to the parties that they might include in their supple-
mental briefs "affidavits of experts as to the effects of Thorazine
when used with alcohol 4 58 or as to the petitioner's mental state
on the evening of the homicide. 4 59 In short, the court implicitly
rejected Strickland's notion that counsel can sua sponte decide
"psychological evidence would be of little help" 60 without care-
ful consideration of what that evidence might reveal, and, in so
doing, it perhaps set down the first building block in the crea-
tion of meaningful and objective post-Strickland' "perform-
455. Id.
456. Id. at 205.
457. It is interesting to note that trial counsel in both Strickland and Rivera were
"experienced." See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2056, Rivera, 594 F. Supp. at 199 (counsel's
practice consisted almost "exclusively" of criminal defense work); see also Blake v.
Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 531-32 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 374 (1985) (failure
of state to provide examining psychiatrist with defendant's confession and inculpatory
letter deprived defendent of effective assistance of counsel; actions made "the outcome
of the trial presumptively unreliable"); see generally Gideon's Realities, supra note 296.
458. On the day of the homicide, petitioner consumed 15 mixed drinks and a "couple
of quarts of beer." Rivera, 594 F. Supp. at 200.
459. Id. at 205. The parties were also directed to file the records of petitioner's hospi-
tal stay.
460. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2071.
461. On at least one subsequent occasion, the court has declined an opportunity to
consider the issues raised by Strickland in a fact-context arguably more striking than
Rivera. See Alvord v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari), where defense counsel accepted his client's refusal to rely on the
insanity defense with "no independent investigation of his client's mental or criminal
history," in spite of fact that the record "demonstrate[d] unequivocally" that defendant
had history of mental illness, and had been found not guilty by reason of insanity on
murder charges six years prior to the indictment in the instant case. Id. at 356. Because
the defendant was ultimately found competent to stand trial, the Eleventh Circuit found
that trial counsel was "ethically bound to follow his client's wishes" to not pursue the
insanity defense. Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 564
F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Fla. 1985). In his angry dissent from certiorari denial, Justice Mar-




At first examination, Barefoot, Ake and Strickland, appear
irreconcilable. In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a
nearly-standardless, seemingly-impossible-to-fail test for ade-
quacy of counsel in the fact context of a death penalty case in
which trial counsel's failure to explore defendant's mental state
as a potential mitigating factor was characterized as a reasonable
"strategic choice. '463 In Barefoot, the Court approved the use of
psychiatric opinion evidence to predict dangerous behavior to
such an extent that the defendant would probably commit fu-
ture "criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society,"46 4 even where the testifying witness never
personally examined the defendant. In Ake, it found a constitu-
tional right for indigent defendants to access to an independent
psychiatric evaluation where such a defendant has preliminarily
shown that "his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a
significant factor at trial."' 465 Underlying all of these decisions is
nothing less than a sea of ambiguity and ambivalence.
Although the Court has not yet rejected its language of
nearly a decade ago that "death is different, '466 its rulings in
these cases reflect an overwhelming ambivalence 67 towards this
doctrine. In Ake, it is rigidly adhered to;46 S in Strickland, it is
paid little more than lip service;46 e and in Barefoot, it is turned
The lower court has countenanced a view of counsel's constitutional duty
that is blind to the ability of the individual defendant to understand his situa-
tion and usefully assist in his defense. The result is to deny to the persons who
are most in need of it the educated counsel of an attorney.
105 S. Ct. at 360 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 417
A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1980); Frendak v. United States, 408 F.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979);
Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41 OHIO ST.
L.J. 637 (1980).
462. See generally, Performance Standards, supra note 337, at 203-11.
463. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
464. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981).
465. Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct. at 1092.
466. Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
467. For the classic definition of "ambivalence," see ALEXANDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS 107-08 (1948).
468. 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
469. 104 S. Ct. at 2064. At least one recent comment specifically criticized Strickland




While the Court apparently remains concerned as to the
quality of representation offered to criminal defendants,
47 1 it
shows a level of deference to counsel's "reasonable professional
judgment"4 72 in Strickland that it had heretofore reserved for
decision-making by mental health professionals.73 While its
Barefoot decision might be read as containing the seeds of the
Ake holding-being partially premised on the assumption that a
defendant would have access to his own expert 4 4 -it must also
be read in light of the well-documented inadequacy of most
counsel to adequately cross-examine psychiatric expert wit-
nesses.475 While Ake finds that "meaningful access to justice
'47 6
is the bellwether of fair trial (specifically contemplating an indi-
gent defendant's right of "access to the raw materials integral to
the building of an effective defense"), 7 Strickland relegates
counsel's failure to seek similar outside expert assistance to the
level of a reasonable "strategic choice. "478 Barefoot rejects the
notion that psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness is
inherently untrustworthy; 479 Ake explicitly fears "the [extremely
high] risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues" 480 because
of the scientific inexactitude of psychiatry and incidence and de-
gree of professional disagreement on the diagnosis and classifica-
capital cases." Note, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Quandry: The Debate Con-
tinues, 18 AKRON L. REv. 325, 333 (1984); see generally, Goodpaster, supra note 412, at
300-05. But cf. State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 397, 694 P.2d 222, 228 (1985) (adopting
Strickland because its "objective standard provides better guidance to lawyers and
judges" than would a "more subjective" test).
470. 463 U.S. at 888. See also, e.g., Geimer, supra note 155, at 739 ("it is the Court
itself which has helped return the law of death to the same roulette wheel proposition it
was at the time of Furman, and even that game is rigged").
471. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985) (right to effective assistance of
counsel on first appeal of right).
472. 103 S. Ct. at 2066.
473. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
474. Ake, 105 S. Ct..at 1097.
475. See, e.g., Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 208, at 167; Poythress, Psychiatric Exper-
tise, supra note 209; Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1974); Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the
Criminal Commitment Process, supra note 208.
476. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
477. Id. at 1093.
478. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2052.
479. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 894.
480. Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
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tion of mental illness.481
Can these circular conflicts be sorted out? While psychiatric
testimony was at (or near) the heart of the issue in each of the
three cases, the insanity defense was an issue only in Ake. To a
lay observer, Glenn Barton Ake might have been the only de-
fendant to conform to common notions of "craziness. 48 2 Al-
though appropriate psychiatric testimony might have served as
the basis of a nonstatutory mitigating factor in Strickland and
as the basis of a rebuttal to the Holbrook-Grigson testimony in
Barefoot, it does not appear that the pleading of the insanity
defense was ever seen as a serious option in either case.
Although the "universe of death penalty issues is shrinking
rapidly,"'"8 the fear of executing the "truly insane" is still a
powerful one.484 The combination of Hinckley-verdict-inspired
legislative restrictions 85 and the Court's decision in Jones v.
United States 8 will no doubt limit the already-miniscule uni-
verse of successful insanity pleas. 87 And, it is not unreasonable
to infer that-for whatever motivations-the Court is engaging
in a self-measured "fundamental fairness" analysis of death pen-
481. See generally, Note, The Constitutional Right to Assistance in Addition to
Counsel in a Death Penalty Case, 23 DUQUESNE L. REV. 753 (1985).
482. See, e.g., Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1091, and supra note 239. On the question of the
Court's perception of how close a defendant so conforms, see, e.g., Perlin, Psychiatric
Testimony in a Criminal Setting, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 143, 148 (1975), quoting
Laswell, Forward, in ARENS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE xi (1974). For a clinical discussion of
the "genuinely insane," see Rachlin, Halpern & Portnow, The Volitional Rule, Personal-
ity Disorders and the Insanity Defense, 14 PSYCH. ANNALS 139, 147 (1984).
For an analysis of abnormal behavior perceived as "crazy"-"an intuitive or com-
monsense meaning of abnormal that reflects social evaluations and values"-see Morse,
supra note 270, at 549. See also, id. at 564-89, 640-45 & 654 ("If any class of crazy
persons is to be treated differently, every attempt should be made to ensure that only a
tiny fraction of crazy persons who seem clearly and totally crazy should be singled out")
(emphasis added). Cf., e.g., Ellsworth, Nukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The Death Quali-
fied Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 81, 91 (1984) ("death-quali-
fied" jurors in controlled simulated study estimated that only 31% of defendants who
plead insanity "really are" insane).
483. Proportionality Review, supra note 57.
484. As the Supreme Court of Mississippi put it somewhat floridly over thirty years
ago, "Amid the darker midst of mental collapse, there is no light against which the
shadow of death may be cast." Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss. 363, 60 So. 2d 807, 809
(1952). But cf. Alvord v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 355 (1984), discussed supra at note 461.
485. See generally, Hinckley's Trial, supra note 15.
486. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
487. See, e.g., Singer, The Aftermath of an Insanity Acquittal: The Supreme Court's
Recent Decision in Jones v. United States, ANNALS, supra note 16, at 114.
[Vol. III
DULLING THE AKE
alty cases to avoid specific, individual executions that "shock the
conscience, '8 8 especially in cases involving the powerful sym-
boll89 of the insanity defense.
4 90
The Court remains overwhelmingly ambivalent about the is-
sues at hand-adequacy of counsel, scope of admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, meaningful access to independent expert assis-
tance, and the interplay between mental incapacity (whether or
not it rises to the level of satisfying the elements of the insanity
defense)-and the death penalty. As noted above, '1 Paul Appel-
baum has suggested that the Court's "tortuous" reasoning is
outcome-determinative; it serves to further a specific "transcen-
dent ideological goal. ' '492 Subsequently, Appelbaum specifically
applied this analysis to Barefoot, finding the Court's behavior
there "explicable,'" 9 in specific furtherance of its decision to
"look with disfavor on further efforts to impede application of
the death penalty. 4 94 While Appelbaum is most likely right-if
the "fundamental fairness"/"shocks the conscience" test sug-
gested above is accepted, the Court's apparently-contrary deci-
sion in Ake appears at least not inconsistent-there is probably
a deeper and murkier explanation available as well.
The Supreme Court remains fascinated with all aspects of
mental disability law, 4" especially in the context of cases involv-
ing the mentally disabled in the criminal law process. 96 Like the
moth drawn to the flame, it continues to grant certiorari in a
whole range of disability cases, 97 in contexts including special
488. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
489. See supra note 1.
490. The court is, of course, no stranger to ambivalence in death penalty cases. For a
comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the Court's approach to "a dark reminder of
our recent legal past," see Miller & Bowman, "Slow Dance on the Killing Ground": The
Willie Francis Case Revisited, 32 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 4 (1985) (analyzing the Court's be-
havior in Louisiana ex. rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), with special atten-
tiop to Justice Frankfurter's public and private positions).
491. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
492. Appelbaum, supra note 120, at 831.
493. Dr. Applebaum Replies, supra note 120, at 388.
494. Id.
495. See, e. g., A Review of the Burger Court, 8 MENT. & PHYS. Dis. L. REPTR. 502
(1984).
496. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980); Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
497. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985);
Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); Heckler v. American Hos-
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education,' 98 zoning,499  and employment rights.500 While this
may well be a partial reflection of the Chief Justice's well-docu-
mented preoccupation with psychiatry in the courts50 1 (and a
residue of his lengthy battles with Judge Bazelon when both sat
on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals), 0 2 this cannot be
the entire answer.50 8 More likely, when dealing with the men-
tally ill, the members of the Court-like the rest of us-are be-
set by ambiguous and ambivalent feelings in need of self-ration-
alization: unconscious feelings of awe, of fear, of revulsion, of
wonder.504
When these feelings are weighed in the symbolic context of
the putatively mentally ill criminal defendant-caught in "the
pital Ass'n, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 48 (1985); United
States Dep't of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 403 (1985); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634
(1986); Smith v. Procunier, 769 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom., Smith v.
Sielaff, 106 S. Ct. 245; Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 566; Treasury Dep't v. Galioto, 602 F. Supp. 682 (D. N.J. 1985), prob. juris.
noted, 106 S. Ct. 307; Colorado v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
785; Allen v. Illinois, 107 Ili.2d 91, 481 N.E.2d 690 (1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380.
498. See, e.g., Burlington School Comm. v. Dep't. of Education, 105 S. Ct. 1996
(1985).
499. Cleburne Living Centers, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1984).
500. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 503 (1984).
501. See, e g., Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers and the Courts, 28 FED. PROB. 3 (1964).
502. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cross v. Harris,
418 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
503. Note, e.g., that the Chief Justice was not able to enlist a single other Justice in
his concurring opinions in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1978), in
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 329, or in Ake, 105 S. Ct. at 1099; see generally Delgado, et. al.,
Concurrence in Quotes, 15 U.C.D.L. REV. 527 (1982).
504. This thought was articulated most eloquently over twenty years ago:
The problem of "whether there would be an insanity defense" or "how to
formulate it" must continue unresolved as long as largely unconscious feelings of
apprehension, awe and anger toward the "sick," particularly if associated with
"criminality," are hidden by the more acceptable conscious desire to protect the
"sick from criminal liability." What must be recognized is the enormous ambiva-
lence toward the "sick" reflected in conflicting wishes to exculpate and to blame;
to sanction and not to sanction; to degrade and to elevate; to stigmatize and not
to stigmatize; to care and to reject; to treat and to mistreat; to protect and to
destroy.
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853, 868-69
(1963) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Perlin, supra note 482, at 147-48; Note, Rules
for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted of Vio-
lent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 294 (1982) (public's "inap-
propriate retributive rage").
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pandemonium between the mad and the bad" 5 5-the conflicts
in the Court's recent holdings appear, if not entirely irreconcila-
ble, at least comprehensible. Perhaps if at least some members
of the Court were to acknowledge the depth of these feelings and
their desire to reconcile them, then some doctrinal consistency
might be within the realm of possibility. Short of this, it is likely
that the Court will remain a prisoner of external symbols and
internal impulses,50 6 and its future holdings will continue to defy
any sort of meaningful harmonization.
505. See Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad": Proce-
dures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United
States, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 793 (1984). The quoted phrase comes from Benham v. Ed-
wards, 501 F. Supp. 1050, 1076 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated sub. nom., Ledbetter v. Benham, 103 S. Ct. 3565 (1983). See Margulies, supra,
at 827.
The leading (and most comprehensive) article on this population is German &
Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted By Reason of
Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011 (1976) (not guilty by reasons of insanity patients
"doubly cursed" and "doubly neglected"). The authors conclude that "no group of pa-
tients has been more deprived of treatment, discriminated against, or mistreated than
persons acquitted of crime on grounds of insanity." Id. at 1074.
506. The temptation to characterize these impulses as "irresistible" is irresistible.
The Author wishes to thank Karen Binder, Thomas Damrauer, Isabel Johnston and
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